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During the American Civil War, a number of southern irregulars operated behind 
Union lines. Though often neglected by historians, many of these irregulars proved 
effective. This study evaluates the different types of irregular combatant found in the 
South, including guerrillas, partisan rangers, and cavalry raiders, who varied in their 
identity, legality, and operations. The effectiveness of these fighters is analyzed in terms 
of their propaganda value, their ability to divert enemy troops, and the defeat of 
offensives by attacking supply lines.  
Though the Union attempted to counter these irregular forces, the greatest 
impediment towards the Confederate irregular war effort was the decisions of the 
Confederate government itself. The West Point-trained leaders of the South were afraid 
of losing control of the independent irregulars. As a result, they never implemented 
policies that would systematically encourage a greater irregular war effort. In doing so, 
the South neglected to fully pursue a strategy that had great potential to alter the course of 





It was not inevitable that the Union would win the Civil War. Throughout the 
struggle, individuals on both sides made decisions that ultimately resulted in Federal 
victory. One such decision was the Confederate high command’s choice to pursue a large 
scale conventional war against the North, and relegate irregular forces to a secondary role 
in terms of strategy and resources. By doing so, the Confederacy played to the Union’s 
strengths as an industrial, rich, and populous state. Had the South followed a different 
strategy, the outcome of the war might have been different.  
Until recently, there was little examination of irregular warfare in the Civil War. 
In the last twenty years or so however, there has been a burgeoning historiography on the 
subject, though many academics still refuse to appreciate its import. Often, those scholars 
who do acknowledge its presence generalize irregular warfare in the Civil War as 
“guerrilla warfare,” that is, a civilian insurrection against an occupying force. These 
historians often consider the issue from a twentieth-century revolutionary perspective, 
claiming that the Confederacy should have pursued a “people’s war” along the vein of 
Mao tse Tung, Che Guevara, or similar revolutionaries.  
This opinion was first proposed by Robert Kerby in his article “Why the 
Confederacy Lost.” Such a war, Kerby and his followers argue, would have negated the 
Union’s conventional strength by forcing them to occupy the entire expanse of the South, 
all the while trying to protect their supply lines and end southern resistance. Eventually, 
Kerby believes, the Union would have given up rather than continue to pursue an 
expensive war with no clear target or visible end. The theory of abandoning conventional 





Beringer and his colleagues in the venerable Why the South Lost the Civil War. Beringer 
says the South lacked the will and nationalism to pursue this course. 
Other historians echo Beringer’s sentiment that the South was unable or unwilling 
to pursue this kind of war, even if they disagree with him that it could have achieved 
victory. Thus Gary Gallagher argues that nineteenth-century southern society would not 
agree to this strategy. Guerrilla warfare was repugnant to many citizens and soldiers on 
both sides, because it was seen as uncivilized and unworthy of brave men. Such a 
strategy would therefore never achieve the necessary support. In addition, Gallagher says 
that an irregular uprising would be severely hindered by the necessity to control the slave 
population, as well as receive the foreign aid he believes was an important precondition 
to any guerrilla victory. He also contends that southern nationalism was manifested in the 
Confederate armies and sustained by their victories. Guerrilla warfare could not 
encourage the same level of support. Stephan Ash in When the Yankees Came further 
states that as southern social and communal bonds broke down under the changes 
wrought by Federal occupation, so too did the will of the southern population to continue 
the struggle. 
 All these authors assume there was only one type of irregular combatant 
available. One of the few historians to identify categories of irregular combatant is Robert 
Mackey in his important monograph The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper 
South. Mackey says that there were multiple types of irregular resistance pursued by 
Confederate forces as a matter of policy and that each were defeated in turn by Union 
adaptability and counter-measures. While this historian’s premises appear persuasive, his 





psychological dimension of irregular warfare, nor does he speculate about the widespread 
adaptation of irregular warfare. Whereas other scholars are too broad in their treatment of 
this topic, Mackey proves too narrow in his application.  
There were in fact a variety of irregular forces that operated both within and 
outside the Confederacy. As irregulars, these fighters shared common attributes: their 
operations were conducted independently of the main field armies and often behind 
enemy lines. Their tactics relied upon surprise, mobility, and the active support of the 
citizenry, while their operations were directed towards the enemy’s weak points, 
especially their logistical and communications lines. Irregular forays were ideal for a 
weaker power unable to match a stronger power’s conventional strength, because the 
defending (conventional) force was required to adequately protect all potential targets in 
their rear. The irregulars, because of the necessarily low force-to-space ratio this 
dispersion entailed, and because of the ambiguity of their destination and location, could 
concentrate against weak enemy forces and obtain local superiority, despite the enemy’s 
overall superiority in numbers.
1
  Accordingly, enemy pickets, couriers, foraging details, 
patrols and small garrisons, railroads, telegraph lines, supply depots, wagons and bridges 
were all attacked. 
The destruction of logistical targets hindered the ability of the foe to conduct 
conventional operations because of the difficulty in supplying their armies. As Antoine 
Henri Jomini (the most widely-read military theoretician of the time at West Point) noted;  
In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in their 
path, …it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions 
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and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. 




Jomini later observed that a general insurrection was not necessary to achieve such 
results, saying of irregular cavalry: “It can carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, 
make his communications very perilous, and destroy the ensemble of his operations. In a 
word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising en masse of a population.”
3
 During 
the war, several offensives were foiled in this manner. Pursuing this logistical strategy, 
irregular warfare, rather than seeking to defeat the principal field armies of the enemy in 
pitched battle, or capture and hold the enemy’s territory, focused on destroying the means 
by which these enemies sustained themselves. 
Towards these strategic ends, irregular missions were shaped in part by the 
technological circumstances of their age. Much has been written on the importance of 
railroads during the American Civil War. Their principal importance was the hitherto 
unknown speeds at which they could transport men and material. Whereas a regiment of 
infantry marching through suitable terrain might travel at three miles an hour, by 1860, 
trains on well-maintained tracks could travel at speeds up to forty miles an hour.
4
 At the 
outbreak of war, the North possessed 21,000 miles of railroad in comparison to 9,000 for 
the South. Both governments commandeered the use of these civilian rail lines as needed 
during the war.
5
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While railroads allowed strategic concentrations to be performed faster than ever 
before, they also dictated to a large degree where armies would be moved and what their 
objectives would be. As the principal source of supplies and reinforcements, commanders 
“tended to cling to lines of advance following a railway line, rather than seeking bold 
areas of manoeuvere [sic.].”
6
 At its peak, the United States Construction Corps, 
responsible only for the 2,000 miles of the Military Railroads, numbered 24,000 men, and 
were paid two dollars a day plus overtime, in comparison to the thirteen dollars a month 
the average soldier earned for most of the war.
7
 Such dedication shows the reliance 
placed on railroads, and the potential disruption their interdiction could have on the 
success or failure of an advance. Their very nature as a long and continuous static line 
made railroads especially difficult to defend along all points of its length. Accordingly, 
Union commanders invested considerable resources and ingenuity into their protection 
and maintenance.         
In addition to their potential direct strategic impact, irregular actions against both 
logistical and combat objectives inflicted material and psychological reverses against the 
enemy that would over time erode his capability and willingness to continue the war. 
This effect was not only physical, measured by cost in material and casualties the 
irregulars inflicted, but also mental. Both civilians and soldiers of the opposing side 
would be discouraged by the lightning strikes and elusiveness of their foes, of the 
hostility of the population that assisted them, and of the inability to effectively control 
territory already “captured.” In the American Civil War, this frustration was displayed by 
the growth of a “hard war” policy that targeted Confederate sympathizers, by the 
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harshness with which Union authorities dealt with captured irregulars, and by the 
considerable attention the newspapers devoted to the exploits of irregulars who harassed 
and embarrassed Union soldiers and commanders. These propaganda coups also had the 
effect of bolstering Confederate morale and support throughout the Confederacy, 
including its occupied territories. 
The first purpose discussed above, a logistical strategy of interdicting the supply 
and communications lines of the enemy, was purely military and meant to affect the 
conventional forces and actions of their opponents, by thwarting an enemy advance or 
diverting troops. The second, though, incorporated political and social realities and goals 
by factoring in the potential impact irregular activities had on the endurance of the foe. 
This second purpose was thus less concerned with the state of the conventional war than 
it was with wearing down the political will of the enemy to continue the fight. To achieve 
these results, the immediate and strictly military consequence of the foray did not matter. 
Instead, eventual victory would be obtained through the cumulative mental and physical 
results of many minor tactical victories.
8
 Utilizing their advantages of surprise, mobility, 
and local support, all irregulars had to do was continue to fight.  
The third principle of irregular warfare was the diversion of troops. Often a result 
of successful logistical or corrosive operations, partisan warfare could cause great 
numbers of soldiers to be tied up defending rear instillations. By forcing the Union to 
disperse its soldiers over a wide area to defend against possible irregular attacks, 
Confederate irregulars could help negate the inherent numerical superiority the populous 
North possessed, thus giving southern conventional armies greater parity with their rivals.  
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Despite these commonalities in method and intent, there were important 
distinctions among irregular combatants. These irregulars can be divided into three 
groups; cavalry raiders, partisan rangers, and guerrillas. Guerrillas were civilian fighters 
waging a rebellion against occupying Federal forces. Rather than being professional 
soldiers of the Confederacy, these combatants were (at least initially) an extension of 
their community, rather than the central government. Guerrillas could achieve all aims of 
irregular warfare; diverting troops, retarding military advances, and eroding enemy 
combatant and civilian morale. It was at the latter, however, that guerrillas had more of 
an effect, deprived as they were of the central leadership necessary to coordinate the 
former. The pursuit of such a psychological victory over their occupiers encouraged the 
tactics of brutality and intimidation practiced by these fighters. Guerrillas did not wear 
uniforms, and, in a crucial distinction from other irregulars, considered civilian targets 
legitimate aims in their personal war. As such, murder and looting of both prisoners and 
non-combatants was a common occurrence in the guerrilla war. The increasingly 
indiscriminant violence these “bushwhackers” indulged in eventually undermined the 
insurrection by corroding their own resources and support. Such activity contributed to 
the view held broadly by both sides that these men were mere criminals, and should be 
treated as such.  
Cavalry raiders were, in contrast, enlisted soldiers of the Confederate army, 
responsible to the chain of command, and coordinated their actions with other 
Confederate forces. As such, these men wore uniforms (thereby distinguishing 
themselves from the surrounding inhabitants) and only attacked military targets. When 





regular cavalry, performing the normal functions of reconnaissance, screening, and 
pursuit. Cavalry raiders thus straddled the line between conventional and unconventional 
forces, and did not exist permanently in their irregular status, though units like John Hunt 
Morgan’s and Nathan Bedford Forrest’s troopers “specialized” in these operations, and 
preferred them to standard cavalry duties. They were thus the most conventional of all 
irregular categories, and also the largest in scale, with several hundred or even a few 
thousand troopers conducting a raid. Raiders were primarily employed by the 
Confederate high command to achieve the first-mentioned object of irregular warfare: a 
logistical strategy aimed at crippling Union armies by denying them supplies. The threat 
this posed also necessitated increased rear guard forces. Though not envisioned in any 
other role by Confederate officials, raiders also achieved the other principle of irregular 
warfare, that of erosion, by becoming folk heroes to southern citizens and bogymen to 
their Yankee adversaries, while consistently inflicting more damage in men and resources 
than they lost.  
 In the spectrum of irregular warfare, partisan rangers existed in between the more 
conventional raiders and the more irregular guerrillas. Like the raiders, rangers were 
uniformed (and legal) enlisted soldiers, subject to Confederate authorities. They followed 
the “rules of war” and primarily struck military targets. They also practiced military 
discipline and coordinated their actions for the benefit of other Confederate forces and 
objectives. Like the guerrillas however, rangers existed permanently in their irregular 
status behind enemy lines (in occupied territory), and operated in small groups of a few 
dozen. Rangers also stood astride the two strategic principles of irregular warfare. While 





many soldiers, their primary impact was on morale, garnering significant propaganda 
victories through their highly visible and daring exploits, and by the Union’s 
embarrassing inability to destroy them. Like raiders, partisan leaders provided 
southerners with idols and good news throughout the war, buoying up determination even 
as the conventional war turned against the Confederacy.  
To explore the experience and latent potential of each type of unconventional 
fighter, attention must be brought to the differing natures and weakness of guerrillas, 
partisans and cavalry raiders. This will be accomplished through case studies of their 
most effective practitioners, beginning in the first chapter with the most accepted and 
conventional of the irregulars; Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan, the 
cavalry raiders. The next chapter will demonstrate the military and political effectiveness 
of the more irregular and less accepted partisan rangers, as demonstrated by John 
Singleton Mosby and John McNeill. Both of these subjects’ long war time experience 
was defined by their irregular operations. While other cavalrymen such as “Red” Jackson, 
Earl Van Dorn or Joseph Wheeler engaged in raids, only John Hunt Morgan rivaled 
Forrest in the number and effectiveness of his raids, as well as his preference for them. 
Dedicated partisan rangers were even rarer; only John McNeil’s rangers rivaled Mosby’s 
43
rd
 Virginia Battalion in activity and duration.  
The final chapter will examine the guerrilla war in Missouri and Arkansas, 
emphasizing the dichotomy between the guerrillas and other irregulars, and how these 
distinctions led to the former’s ultimate failure. Although there were a few notable 
guerrillas such as William Quantrill and Bill Anderson, beyond a few famous actions and 





order to trace the general trends and developments of guerrilla warfare and the Union 
response to them, it is more helpful to examine a geographical area where the war was 
defined by insurrection. The states of Missouri and Arkansas form ideal case studies to 
witness the power and shortcomings of guerrilla warfare.  
This work as a whole also follows a rough geographical structure, as in each 
region of the Confederacy a different form of irregular warfare predominated; with 
guerrillas most active in the Trans-Mississippi, cavalry raiders in the western theatre of 
Tennessee and Kentucky, and partisan rangers in Virginia. As these regions contained the 
most frequent and visible examples of each irregular form, practitioners of each type 
operating outside of their respective areas will be given only minimal attention.      
 When viewed in hindsight, history can frequently be perceived as being 
deterministic. Because “B” followed “A,” it is assumed that “B” must have necessarily 
followed, that there was no other possible outcome. Many historians realize this rejection 
of human agency negates what makes the study of history so compelling; the 
consequences of decision making. By examining alternative decisions, one can better 
appreciate the consequences of the actual outcome, and why it occurred. The study of 
irregular warfare in the American Civil War remains understudied in relation to its 
realized military and political accomplishments and its greater potential to alter the 




Chapter One: Cavalry Raiders 
Independent, insubordinate, and aggressive to the point of rashness, Nathan 
Bedford Forrest represented a form of warfare that terrified his Union foes and West 
Pointers on both sides of the conflict. Arguably more than any other personality in the 
war, Forrest made irregular warfare a visible reality in the minds of Yankee war-planners. 
Forrest and cavalry raiders like him blurred the lines between conventional and irregular, 
and what was for many, acceptable and unacceptable, modes of war. In contrast to the 
seemingly inept conduct of the regular Confederate armies in the West, cavalry raiders 
under their dashing commanders proved to be the southerners’ most effective defense in 
that theatre. Such was the consternation and destruction these men wrought that General 
William T. Sherman famously vowed in frustration that he would have Forrest pursued 
“to the death, if it cost 10,000 lives and breaks the treasury.”
1
 
Of all styles of irregular warfare practiced in the American Civil War, none was 
as widely used by the Confederate government as cavalry raiders. Reflecting their 
irregular status, raiders, unlike partisan rangers, were not organized under the auspices of 
special legislation, nor banned outright like guerrillas. As previously discussed, raiding 
parties were composed of regularly constituted cavalry troopers, and thus were only 
irregular when on a raid, otherwise functioning as conventional cavalry. Nevertheless, 
some cavalry units, such as the cavalry commands of Forrest and John Hunt Morgan, 
specialized in these irregular actions. This was codified when the Army of Tennessee’s 
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cavalry was reorganized in late 1862 into three brigades of “regular” cavalry and two 
“partisan” bodies under Morgan and Forrest.
2
  
These officers, often at the behest of their commanding general, would lead their 
men against rear area targets in the hope of hindering Union advances through pursuit of 
the logistical strategy. Because of their greater numbers and access to artillery, raiders 
could often destroy targets too well defended for other irregulars. As Jomini noted, 
irregular cavalry could through their activities simulate the effects of a mass rising 
against the foe’s communications.
3
  Brigadier General Basil W. Duke, an officer of John 
Hunt Morgan’s command (and his brother in law), echoed this sentiment when he spoke 
of his leader: “The author of the far reaching ‘raid,’ so different from the mere cavalry 
dash, he accomplished with his handful of men results which would otherwise have 
required armies and the costly preparations of regular and extensive campaigns.”
4
 Due to 
their primary focus on the logistical strategy of irregular warfare, and as a subunit of the 
main army in the theater, cavalry raiders were more concerned with affecting the 
conventional operations of the war than other types of irregulars, and existed for the 
regular army’s benefit. This was their primary raison d’être.    
Cavalry raiders also, however, proved useful in tying down large numbers of 
enemy troops in the defense of these areas. Equally important, though less considered by 
Confederate decision-makers, was the cavalry raider’s capability to erode the foe’s 
resources and provide a visible, if temporary, Confederate presence in places no longer 
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occupied by southern armies. In keeping with their irregular status, cavalry raiders 
derived much of their equipment from their adversaries.
5
 Perhaps because of their focus 
on the rear echelon, cavalry raiders, though utilizing means long practiced in organized 
war, suffered the same stigma of illegitimacy that their partisan brothers did, often being 
labeled as criminal guerrillas by angry and embarrassed opponents. 
The most famous raids by the most famous practitioners occurred in the states of 
Kentucky and Tennessee. Geopolitically, these states were of vital importance to both 
North and South. Apart from guarding the interior of the Confederacy, both regions 
contained populations sharply divided between Rebel and Unionist sympathies. As such, 
both Washington and Richmond felt political pressure to protect these citizens, while the 
inhabitants themselves were often imbued with a passion to defend their homes against 
perceived enemies. Due to their great mobility and the changing circumstances of war, 
raiders under Morgan or Forrest did not limit themselves to the area immediately behind 
the armies, but rather operated across wide swaths of both states over the course of the 
war.  
By early 1862, Kentucky was under nominal Federal control, though it remained 
threatened by irregulars for the rest of the war. In Tennessee, conventional Confederate 
forces had been driven out of pro-secession Western and Middle Tennessee by the end of 
the same year, but retained Unionist East Tennessee until the end of 1863.  The railways 
in these areas were of crucial importance for continued conquest of the South. In 
Kentucky, the Louisville & Nashville railroad supplied the Union armies attempting to 
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drive the Confederates out of Tennessee. In Tennessee there were also important 
railroads. The Mississippi Central Railroad and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad connected 
the state to Vicksburg, Mississippi, while Chattanooga, Tennessee served as a hub for 
railroads into Georgia.
6
 Securing these lines, as well as waterways like the Tennessee and 
Cumberland Rivers, was therefore an important component of the Union advance into the 
Deep South.    
Like other irregulars, cavalry raiders usually operated in areas where they 
themselves had lived. They therefore benefitted from a personal knowledge of the ground 
and the people. One Union man said that “Forrest knew every inch of the ground and 
every ford and cross-road.”
7
 Because raiders did not function permanently behind enemy 
lines like guerrillas or partisans, active civilian support was less crucial to the success of 
their operations. Nevertheless, many times the raiders would return from an expedition 
with more men than they had left with, as locals swelled the ranks. Raiders thus gained 
recruits from areas that otherwise would have been unavailable to the Confederacy. 
While in the field, civilians frequently provided the Confederates with supplies, 
intelligence on enemy dispositions, and guides. 
Just as the regular Confederate army and other irregular groups reflected a cross-
section of southern society, so too did the cavalry raiders. Southern culture in general 
prized the horseback-riding skills necessary to conduct raids. One of Forrest’s privates, a 
college-educated Classics teacher from Tennessee, noted the abundance of skilled 
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practitioners: “The South, in the war period, was essentially a country of horseback 
riders.”
8
 Sherman confirmed this view, writing of raiders he referred to as “the young 
bloods of the South”: “War suits them and the rascals are brave, fine riders, bold to 
rashness, and dangerous subjects in every sense. . . . They are the most dangerous set of 
men that this war has turned loose upon the world. They are splendid riders, first-rate 
shots, and utterly reckless. Stewart, John Morgan, Forrest, and [Red] Jackson, are the 
types and leaders of this class. These men must all be killed or employed by us before we 
can hope for peace.”
9
 
Regardless of classification, the initiative for irregular warfare stemmed almost 
entirely from the practitioners themselves. Forrest was no exception to this rule, 
demonstrating his independence and ambition early in life.  From humble origins as the 
son of a poor blacksmith, the future “king of cavalry,” had risen through the hierarchical 
ranks of southern society to become one of Memphis’s richest and most prominent 
citizens.
10
 That this occurred in spite of the unsavory, low-brow connotations slave-
trading (his profession) carried in Antebellum society displays just how much Forrest’s 
character propelled him to success.     
During the war, Forrest personally embodied the same disdain for convention that 
his tactics manifested. Joining as a private, Forrest ended the war as a lieutenant general, 
the only such meteoric rise in either army during the war. Brave and imposing, the 
Confederate officer participated in combat to a level unparalleled by others of his rank. 
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During the war, the slave trader-turned-soldier killed thirty men in combat, one more than 
the number of horses shot from under him.
11
  Like other irregulars, the cavalry chief had 
a low opinion of West Point regulars, believing their tactics to be unimaginative. He later 
boasted that “Whenever I met one of them fellers [sic] that fit by note, I generally 
whipped h-ll out of him before he got his tune pitched.”
12
 This disdain extended to the 
regulars on his own side. Forrest had seen southern officers capitulate at Fort Donelson. 
Later, he witnessed General Braxton Bragg make similarly poor judgments. Such 
observations made the Tennessean more confident in his own judgment, even to the point 
of insubordination. John Morton, one of his officers confessed that “he cared little for 
army regulations and tactics.”
13
 When a superior gave orders he did not agree with, 
Forrest often ignored them.  
Though more genteel and educated than his peer from Tennessee, John Hunt 
Morgan displayed a resourcefulness and tenacity reminiscent of Forrest in his 
Antebellum life. Like Forrest and many other irregulars, the middle-class Morgan was 
largely self-made, having found success in manufacturing. Similarly, the blue-grass 
native was no stranger to violence: he had been suspended from Transylvania College for 
dueling before fighting in the Mexican-American War.
14
 
Personally genial and unassuming in contrast to the bellicose Forrest, Morgan was 
also personally brave and confident in his own judgment to the point of disobedience. It 
was this loss of control over irregulars that West Point educated Confederates found so 
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disconcerting about their mode of war. The commonalities with Forrest, and for that 
matter other irregulars, was not coincidence but indications of traits necessary for 
effective independent service behind enemy lines, where resourcefulness and quick, 
decisive thinking were musts. 
 Despite their unorthodox methods, both raiders considered themselves real 
soldiers, not thieves or bushwhackers. Having spent over a year in the “regular” cavalry 
before making irregular names for themselves in 1862, both officers usually behaved like 
lawful combatants in the field. The institutional professionalism of raiders was displayed 
in their utter contempt for civilian bushwhackers. In February 1865, with guerrilla-
brigands running rampant throughout the Deep and Trans-Mississippi South, Forrest 
informed a Union counter-part he was communicating with that “he was as anxious to rid 
the country of them [guerrillas] as was any officer in the U. S. Army, and that he would 
esteem it a favor if General Thomas would hang every one he caught.”
15
 In his 1862 
“Proclamation to the People of Estelle and Adjoining Counties,” Morgan proved he 
shared the conventional disgust with guerrillas. Echoing Union General Henry Halleck’s  
statement in Missouri the same year, the Confederate officer declared “Private citizens 
who seek opportunity to ambush our soldiers commonly known as ‘Bushwhackers’ will 
be regarded as outlaws, and orders will be issued to shoot them wherever found.”
16
 
Although Morgan’s statement was directed towards Unionists, clearly he, like his Union 
opposites, did not view civilian fighters as legal combatants.  
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Tactically, cavalry raiders were aggressive, relying on surprise like other 
irregulars. William Witherspoon, a lieutenant in Forrest’s cavalry, attributed the latter’s 
superiority over conventional foes to this aggression. Whereas West Pointers maintained 
a reserve, reflecting a preoccupation with preventing a rout, Forrest committed the 
maximum number of men to the battle, once even neglecting to designate horse-holders. 
“If we are whipped we’ll not need any horses,” he told a protesting subordinate. In 
keeping with this perceived superiority over wooden professionals, Morton declared that 
his methods “couldn’t be computed by any known rules of warfare.”
17
 Rather than 
relying on the conventional mounted charge like regular cavalry were expected to employ 
early in the war, raiders usually fought on foot with infantry weapons, recognizing the 
realities of unsuitable terrain and improving firepower. British observer General Viscount 
Garnet Wolseley dubbed them “winged infantry,” while Basil Duke agreed that they were 
“not cavalry, but mounted riflemen.”
18
 Raiders were quick to exploit the psychological 
dimension of warfare, spreading fear and confusion through misinformation and bold 
maneuvering. On more than one occasion, Forrest was able to demand the surrender of a 
fortified place rather than storm it.
19
  
When raiders wished to avoid combat (a frequent desire, as their objectives were 
oriented towards logistical rather than manpower destruction, and speed was of the 
essence) they could retreat by a different route from whence they came, and thereby 
                                                          
17
 Robert Selph Henry, ed. As They Saw Forrest: Some Recollections and Comments of Contemporaries, 
93, 275-6. 
18
 Robert Selph Henry, ed. As They Saw Forrest: Some Recollections and Comments of Contemporaries, 
25; Basil Duke, History of Morgan’s Cavalry, 174-79. 
19
 Basil Duke, History of Morgan’s Cavalry, 26; Robert Selph Henry, ed. As They Saw Forrest: Some 





could usually outpace their ignorant and confused pursuers.
20
 This advantage was 
enlarged by the riders’ local topographical knowledge and superior mounts. 
Contemporary observers realized this; one insightful journalist informed his readers that 
“cavalry is not compelled to fight a superior force, except it be of a similar kind, for it can 
readily escape infantry and heavy artillery, and if surrounded, can cut itself out.”
21
  
Morgan and Forrest began their irregular careers together in the summer of 1862. 
In May, the Confederate Army of Mississippi had been driven out of Corinth, Mississippi 
during the Siege of Corinth. By July of that year, Union General Don Carlos Buell was 
advancing toward Chattanooga with 40,000 men. Unable to match the Federals 
conventionally, Confederate General Pierre Gustave T. Beauregard ordered the raiders to 
disrupt the Yankee advance as best they could. The operation itself was left to the field 
commanders. Forrest directed his First Tennessee Raid against Murfreesboro, a hundred 
miles away from Buell’s target.  
The 1,400 troopers left for their destination on July 9, reaching Murfreesboro by 
the 13th. The town was manned by a garrison consisting of two full regiments and parts 
of a third, as well as an artillery battery, a force of similar size to his own. Seizing the 
initiative, Forrest capitalized on the dispersed positions of the defenders to defeat them in 
detail. Sending a holding force to delay the more distant bluecoats, Forrest began his 
assault at dawn to maximize surprise. Driving the 9
th
 Michigan from their camp on the 
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outskirts of the city, the Rebel cavalry pursued the survivors to a nearby hill while other 
cavalrymen carried the fighting into the town’s streets.
22
 
 By 8 A.M., the Union infantry had established themselves in two defensive 
positions half a mile apart. Knowing how costly attacking prepared works were, Forrest 
used a combination of intimidation and theatrics to induce his opponents to surrender. To 
the 9
th
 Michigan’s Lieutenant Colonel John Parkhurst, Forrest sent the following 
message; “COLONEL: I must demand an unconditional surrender of your force as 
prisoners of war or I will have every man put to the sword. You are aware of the 
overpowering force I have at my command, and this demand is made to prevent the 
effusion of blood.”
23
 To the commander of the 3
rd
 Minnesota he sent a similar ultimatum 
accompanied by a staged demonstration that convinced his enemy that he possessed a 
force twice its actual size.
24
 The northern officers surrendered. Forrest reported that for a 
cost of less than a hundred men he had killed or wounded two hundred and:  
captured two brigadier-generals, staff and field officers, and 1,200 men; 
burnt $200,000 worth of stores; captured sufficient stores with those 
burned to amount to $500,000, and brigade of 60 wagons, 300 mules, 150 
or 200 horses, and field battery of four pieces; destroyed the railroad and 
depot at Murfreesborough [sic]. Had to retreat to McMinnville, owing to 




As successful as Forrest’s first raid was, it was rivaled by that of Morgan’s taking 
place at the same time in Kentucky. The results of the First Kentucky Raid were 
succinctly recorded in his report: 
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I left Knoxville on the 4
th
 day of this month with about nine hundred men, 
and returned to Livingston on the 28
th
 inst. with nearly twelve hundred, 
…during which time I traveled over a thousand miles, captured seventeen 
towns, destroyed all the Government supplies and arms in them, dispersed 
about fifteen hundred Home-guards and paroled nearly twelve hundred 
regular troops. I lost in killed, wounded and missing of the number that I 
carried into Kentucky, about ninety.
26
  
The incursion caused considerable consternation among Unionists in the state, and caused 
millions of dollars of damage to Federal property.
27
 In addition, through the use of scouts, 
civilian assistance, and Federal telegraphs, Morgan was able to provide his superiors with 
crucial intelligence regarding Union troop movements and intentions.
28
  
Morgan followed up his success with an even more decisive action a month later 
in August, the “Gallatin Raid.” The bluegrass troopers’ target was the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad tunnel; a thousand-foot shaft that served as the primary artery for the 
Army of Ohio’s supplies. After capturing most of the 375-man garrison by surprise, 
Morgan loaded a locomotive with explosives and sent it through the tunnel, collapsing 
the structure. The resulting damage closed the passage for three months. Upon his retreat, 
Morgan heavily defeated a 700-strong body of cavalry sent to intercept him, inflicting 
fifty percent casualties on the attackers.
29
  
 Together, these raids put irresistible logistic pressure on Buell’s army. The 
Appalachian Highlands that lay between him and Chattanooga were not agriculturally 
capable of supplying his army, only the railroads could do that. Buell’s advance virtually 
                                                          
26
 Duke, History of Morgan’s Cavalry, 205.  
27
 James Ramage, Rebel Raider: The Life of General John Hunt Morgan (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1986), 104-5. 
28
 Morgan to Samuel Cooper, August 22, 1862, in How it Was: Four Years Among the Rebels (Nashville, 
TN, Privately Published, 1892), 204. http://solomon.cwld.alexanderstreet.com/cgi-
bin/asp/philo/cwld/getdoc.pl?S2002-D040 (accessed January 16, 2013); Duke, History of Morgan’s 
Cavalry, 204. 
29





ceased, even though there was no sizable force of Confederates in Chattanooga.
30
 
“Instead of moving against the enemy,” one northern officer later admitted, “he had now 
to bend all energies to his own security.”
31
 Coordinating their activities with each other 
for the benefit of a third party (conventional Confederate forces and the defense of the 
city), the cavalry raiders displayed a capacity to cooperate with other groups to achieve 
their objectives; something that guerrillas rarely did. Two parties totaling less than 3,000 
men had stopped an invasion of 40,000. Furthermore, the successful raids paved the way 
for Bragg’s invasion of Kentucky, in part encouraged by the popular support Morgan had 
received.  
 Having achieved the irregular goal of logistical destruction, the raiders 
compounded their success by fulfilling the other aims of irregular warfare, that of troop 
diversion and erosion of resources. Protecting three hundred miles of railroad track was 
not easy for the Union commander. Guards were posted on every train and fortifications 
built at important points. In all, Buell devoted two entire divisions to protecting his 
communications, greatly weakening his front-line strength in the process.
32
 
 Aside from the lopsided ratio of material damage to enemy garrisons and supplies 
compared to Confederate casualties, raiders inflicted less tangible but equally serious 
psychological and political damage, a component of the erosion principle. The northern 
press reacted in panic. Multiplying the size of Forrest’s force to as much as 6,000, 
journalists speculated that the Confederates would retake Nashville. The Philadelphia 
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Inquirer pessimistically wrote that in that city the soldiers would “give the best fight 
possible, and if compelled to yield, will shell the city.”
33
 Some Yankee officers took 
desperate action to prevent a popular uprising in support of the irregular raiders. The 
Alexandria Gazette reported that when Brigadier General J. T. Boyle, Union commander 
of Louisville, learned of Murfreesboro’s state he declared “It is ordered that every able-
bodied man take arms and aid in repelling the marauders. Every man who does not join 
will remain in his house forty eight hours, and be shot down if he leaves it.”
34
 Union 
leadership also came under fire. “This disaster is a fitting commentary on the almost 
perfect inaction in which Gen. Halleck has kept his army since the retreat of Beauregard 
from Corinth,” accused one Maryland paper.
35
  
 In the wake of these incursions, a few Yankee journalists grasped the inherent 
challenges of irregular warfare. One perceptive reporter observed: 
The perfect familiarity of the marauders with the topography of the 
country, the impossibility of protecting the small detachments distributed 
on the road for guarding purposes against surprise and attack by 
overwhelming numbers soon convinced our commanders that the road 
could only be held by using the whole of the army in forming an unbroken 
cordon in front of it. Even the numerous tetee-dupont [sic], stockades, 
redoubts, fortified camps, &e., that had been constructed, were found to 
furnish protection to certain points only, while the intervening sections of 
the road remained at the mercy of the rebels.
36
 
The ability of raiders to concentrate their strength to achieve temporary local superiority 
over a dispersed foe was also noticed by the author of a Springfield Illinois Weekly 
Republican article. “To such a style of warfare,” he concluded, “we are inevitably 
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exposed with so long a line and so many points to garrison, and we must expect some 
such casualties.” Forced to defend static positions, the Union left the initiative with the 
southerners, who could pick their targets at will and exploit the superior mobility of their 
mounted forces.
37
 Because of the wide range of their targets and movements, raiding 
allowed the weaker power to concentrate against the weakest points of what was 
otherwise a much stronger opponent. Therefore, they need only engage their foes when 
they possessed local superiority in strength. Such an approach allowed the Confederacy 
to keep the initiative in a theatre otherwise defined by Union offensives.
38
   
 In contrast to the melancholy North, the southern press abounded with jubilance. 
“Morgan has left his trail of fire and blood,” read the Mobile Register’s front page 
triumphantly, “and has terrified not only the Unionists of Kentucky, but the whole 
abolitionists of the North and West. Forrest, in middle Tennessee, has accomplished the 
same results on a grander scale. . . . For all this these two distinguished men have 
received the applause and praise of their country.”
39
 Another paper likewise addressed 
the psychological erosion of the raids: 
You have heard of Forrest capturing 1,200 Yankees and General 
Crittenden at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, also of Morgan’s exploits in 
Kentucky. Both of these gallant partisans destroyed quantities of stores 
and, what is better, reassured the drooping spirits of our friends in this 
quarter. The Yankee sympathizers in that region are stunned by this 
audacity. The great benefit of these raids is that it wears out our Yankee 
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Cavalry raiding was conceptualized by most Confederate planners as merely a subsidiary 
tactic to set the stage for conventional success. While it was an extremely potent weapon 
in the logistical strategy, it could in fact contribute to the war effort in other ways. 
 Influential as the First Tennessee and Kentucky Raids were, their success was 
duplicated by another pair of coordinated strikes later in the year. By December of 1862, 
General Ulysses S. Grant, in conjunction with a water-borne army headed by William T. 
Sherman, was threatening Vicksburg, Mississippi with capture. Acting on the suggestion 
of one of his cavalry commanders, Lt. General John C. Pemberton, in charge of the 
Confederate defense, dispatched Earl Van Dorn on December 17 with 3,500 men to 
destroy the Federal depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi. The result was one of the largest 
cavalry raids of the war.  
 To further disrupt and distract Grant, Forrest was loosed by Bragg six days 
earlier on West Tennessee with 2,100 men to cut the Mississippi Central Railroad and the 
Mobile & Ohio Railroad. Grant drew all his supplies from these lines, while his 
accumulated stores were stockpiled at Holly Springs. Their twin destruction would make 
his advance impossible, as frequent campaigning by both combatants had already 
stripped the region of foodstuffs.
41
 That the safety of his supplies was precarious the 
general knew. On December 15, the day Forrest entered West Tennessee on his second 
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raid, Grant confided his anxiety to his sister: “I am extended now like a Peninsula into an 
enemies country with a large Army depending for their daily bread upon keeping open a 
line of rail-road running one hundred & ninety miles through an enemy’s country, or at 
least through territory occupied by a people terribly embittered and hostile to us.”
42
  
 Forrest confirmed these fears. On December 16, the day after he crossed the 
Tennessee River, Forrest dispersed a Federal force of several hundred cavalry at 
Lexington before dividing his command to maximize confusion and destruction. Despite 
many new recruits, Forrest’s command took hundreds of Union prisoners over the next 




 Extracting his scattered command from the now alert Federals would be 
complicated by a pursuing force under General Jeremiah Sullivan that outnumbered the 
Tennessean’s own force. Believing his force too tired to outrun the pursuers, Forrest 
instead confronted the enemy at Parker’s Crossroads on December 31. Attacking an 
infantry detachment numbering around 1,600 men, Forrest assailed the bluecoats 
throughout the morning, hammering their front before successfully turning their flank and 
threatening their rear. “We drove them through the woods with great slaughter and 
several white flags were raised in various portions of the woods and the killed and 
wounded were strewn over the ground. Thirty minutes more would have given us the 
day.” he told his superiors.  
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 Forrest’s victory was undone though by the negligence of the men he had 
ordered to guard a nearby approach. Unbeknownst to the Rebel raiders, Yankee 
reinforcements had arrived and promptly assaulted their rear. The southern cavalrymen 
adapted quickly, attacking in both directions before retreating rapidly. Forrest sustained a 
hundred casualties and 250 troopers captured in exchange for 237 Union dead.
44
 Though 
it was an undignified ending to an otherwise successful foray, the battle of Parker’s 
Crossroads demonstrated that raiders could function under less than ideal circumstances. 
Forrest’s performance in the battle allowed his command to escape and raid again. As a 
whole, the expedition had been a great success. Besides completing their logistical 
objective, the Confederate interlopers in Tennessee had captured 1,500 soldiers, wounded 
or killed hundreds more, and replaced their obsolete shotguns and squirrel rifles with 
captured modern military small arms.
45
 
 The Rebel activity in Tennessee was compounded by Van Dorn’s raid in 
northern Mississippi. While Federal attention was focused to the north, Van Dorn 
successfully attacked the supply depot at Holly Springs on December 19. The surprised 
garrison of 1,500 surrendered, rendering up vast warehouses of supplies, machine shops, 
and a newly built hospital to destruction. The Confederate commander estimated the 
damage at $1.5 million.
46
 This figure, by no means implausible or unmatched by other 
raids, is all the more remarkable when it is considered that in 1862, such a figure would 
pay the annual salaries of more than 9,600 Union soldiers.  More importantly, Van Dorn 
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and Forrest had thwarted Grant’s campaign to Vicksburg.  “Raids made upon the 
railroad,” Grant reported, “have cut me off from supplies, so that farther advance by this 
route is perfectly impracticable.”
47
 Grant was forced to withdraw back to Memphis, 
Tennessee. This in turn allowed Pemberton the opportunity to reinforce Vicksburg’s 
garrison with his field army that had been facing Grant. Sherman’s smaller force, 
insufficient for the enlarged task, soon followed his commander back north.
48
 Once 
again, raiders had succeeded in stopping the Yankees where conventional armies had 
failed. 
 This much had now been recognized by the citizens of the South. Catherine 
Edmondston of North Carolina reflected this truth as well as the buoying affects of the 
raids when she wrote in her diary that “At the West we have had a series of successes, 
small in themselves…but all tending to animate and cheer the spirits of our soldiers 
depressed by the retreat from Kentucky. . . .Forrest and his men have not been idle.”
49
 
Some perceived the cavalry raiders, not armies, as their country’s principle defense. 
Augusta’s Daily Constitutionalist printed the telling declaration that “should the enemy 
succeed in penetrating still farther into the heart of the country, we hope our cavalry will 
succeed in making his position untenable for want of supplies.”
50
 The same article further 
espoused the strengths of a logistical raiding strategy:  
The more recent exploits of Morgan, Van Dorn, Forrest, Wheeler, and 
Wharton, have made manifest the great power of our cavalry, and pointed 
out the proper object for its attacks. …The cavalry’s business is not to 
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destroy a large army by direct action, but to cripple it and render it 
inefficient. …By destroying the enemy’s stores, burning his trains, 
capturing his guards, cutting his communications…the Confederate 




 While the front pages of southern papers continued to build up these irregulars 
as heroes for a hopeful populace, Union supporters suffered an inverse, erosive affect on 
their morale. Sherman gloomily reported that his retreat had been met in the North with 
accusations of “repulse, failure, and bungling.”
52
 The New York Daily Tribune devoted 
part of its front page to describing how Forrest had with “6,000 cavalry and eight guns” 
(four times their actual number) destroyed vast stores despite Grant’s warning “to all 
commanders on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, so that nobody was surprised, and ample 
time was had to defend the road.”
53
 To this hint of incompetence, Philadelphia’s Public 
Ledger added to its front page account that “When it is understood that General Grant’s 
vast army is depending on this road for supplies of every description, it will be seen that 
somebody is lacking in something.”
54
 An Illinois soldier confirmed this fear and 
evidenced his dissatisfaction in the wake of Forrest’s latest strike in his journal:  
The destruction of the railroad has cut off our supplies, and there is no 
telling just exactly how long it may be before it is fixed and in running 
order again, so they have been compelled, I suppose, to cut down our 
rations. . . . I just wish that Forrest, who is the cause of about all this 
trouble, had to go without anything to eat. . . .Maybe after he had been 
hungry real good for a while he’d know how it felt himself, and would 
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1862 has in hindsight been seen as the high point of Confederate raiding 
effectiveness. Union officials, often unable or unwilling to distinguish between cavalry 
raiders and other irregulars, responded initially with a mixture of legalistic or moral 
rhetoric and increased passive defenses via fortification and larger garrisons. Often 
belittled as a mere “horse thief,” some northerners accused Morgan of much more 
heinous crimes. One New York Times journalist accused Morgan after his Ohio raid in 
1863 of committing “all sorts of crimes…robbing rich and poor…stealing horses and 
murdering innocent and defenseless men, women, and children.”
56
 When Morgan was 
captured during this “Great Raid,” he and his men were not sent to a POW camp like 
their comrades in the infantry and regular cavalry. Instead, upon the urging of Union 
General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, they were delivered to the Ohio State Penitentiary like 
common criminals and denied parole.
57
 The officers owed their later freedom to a daring 
escape rather than a prisoner exchange. 
In fact, as already shown, Morgan was a commissioned officer in the Confederate 
Army that, although operating independently of the main army, cooperated with, and 
received orders from, military superiors. Rather than targeting civilians, Morgan actively 
tried to protect them. One of his men, writing to his sister, noted that “Morgan always 
notifies the trains on the road after he has burned the bridges, which shows he is 
something of a man after all -- nay, an honorable man; for if a train should go down 
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through these trestle-works, not a soul would be left to tell the tale.”
58
 Rather than 
encourage looting, Morgan issued stern orders to his men against stealing and abusing 
civilians, calling such perpetrators “cowardly miscreants.”
59
  
Morgan’s persecution for his legitimate methods of war did not end with his 
imprisonment. On September 4, 1864, while conducting his last raid, Morgan was caught 
unawares as a Union advance guard entered the town where he slept. Running from his 
bedroom, Morgan found himself identified, cut off, and discovered. Though the 
southerner attempted to surrender, one blue trooper recognized the “horse thief” and shot 
him dead.
60
 Thus ended the irregular career of John Hunt Morgan, a commissioned 
officer in the Confederate Army. 
The connection of raiding with guerrilla warfare and banditry led many Union 
officials to retaliate against local civilians as well, encouraging the prosecution of a “hard 
war” policy. One such instance occurred after the afore mentioned Gallatin raid of 1862, 
when angry Yankee soldiers arbitrarily arrested sixty males of the town, including boys 
and old men, to be “taken to Nashville to be hanged as spies for aiding Morgan.”
61
 
Fortunately for the prisoners, upon learning of their predicament the raiders returned to 
the town and rescued them.
62
 Though this act of retribution was spontaneous, some 
believed it to be a matter of course when dealing with raiders.  During a special 
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commission held to evaluate General Buell’s command decisions, Morgan’s raids were 
discussed. When asked why Buell did not conduct retaliatory strikes against the local 
population he thought were assisting “these parties of guerrillas,” Buell countered that he 
objected “to this term ‘guerillas’ as applied to these troops. They are as much troops as 
any in the rebel service. . . .I know of no reason for giving them a character which does 
not belong to them, for they are not ‘guerrillas’ in the proper sense of that term.”
63
 
Buell’s understanding of this distinction was rare among his peers.  
Union commanders also tried to mitigate the logistical damage inflicted by the 
raids. The primary method was an increase in fortification and garrisons.  Around these 
vulnerable sites, wooden blockhouses were constructed from eighteen inch-thick logs to 
render them impervious to small arms fire. Square or cross-shaped, the one to two story 
buildings would usually house only a few dozen men. They were nevertheless potentially 
formidable obstacles, surrounded as they were by a palisade, loop-holed for defense, and 
sometimes containing artillery.
64
 By late 1862, the Louisville and Nashville railroad and 
western district of Kentucky alone was manned by over 20,000 soldiers guarding 
communications and depots, excluding additional forces frequently dispatched to pursue 
specific raiders.
65
 Such practices merely strengthened the dispersion affect of cavalry 
raiding, while the low force-to-space ratio in the large western theatre meant that raiders 
could still find and strike weak spots. 
                                                          
63
 Special Commission, General Reports, December 25, 1862. United States War Department, The War of 
the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, (ser. 1) 
64
 Ron Field, American Civil War Fortifications (2): Land and Field Fortifications, (New York: Osprey 
Publishing, 2005), 10, 12. 
65





 Some commanders attempted to limit their reliance on the railroads. In his 
memoirs, Grant claimed that the raids by Van Dorn and Forrest had revealed the grave 
limitations in maintaining long supply lines over enemy country, and encouraged his later 
decision to live off the land.
66
 In his immediate report however, Grant specifically denied 
this possibility, saying “The country does not afford supplies for troops, and but a limited 
supply of forage.”
67
 “Living off the land,” made so famous by Grant in his Second 
Vicksburg Campaign, General Samuel Curtis in Arkansas, and Sherman in Georgia and 
the Carolinas, was only possible when the necessarily dispersed armies were not 
threatened by large scale organized resistance, and when the country was sufficiently 
undamaged to sustain an army.   
Major General William Rosecrans tried to thwart the raiders’ logistical strategy 
by stockpiling his supplies in advance of his assault against Bragg near Murfreesboro in 
late December 1862. In this he was successful. Though Morgan destroyed two vast 
trestles and closed the Louisville and Nashville railroad for five weeks, Rosecrans was 
not forced to retreat. The raid still, however, fulfilled the other two principles of irregular 
warfare. Rosecrans dispatched 7,300 men of all arms to chase the raiders (this in addition 
to the 20,000 already guarding the rear); men that would have been far better spent in the 
approaching battle.
68
 In addition, Morgan inflicted $2 million worth of damage, captured 
1,800 men and killed many others; all the while losing less than a hundred.
69
 Besides, as 
the Holly Springs raid showed, depots could also be destroyed. Like living off the land, 
stockpiling was a temporary solution.  
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As was the case with other irregulars, Union officials were most successful when 
tailoring their responses to the specific threat. The indirect and passive policies already 
discussed had not dampened the raiders’ success. Many realized that a fundamental 
problem was the weakness of Union cavalry in both quantity and quality compared to 
their southern cousins. Rosecrans tried vigorously to rectify this disparity. He acquired 
thousands of additional mounts, repeating rifles, and carbines to better arm his expanded 
cavalry wing; by July 1863, 12,000 Federal troopers faced a similar number of lesser 
equipped southern cavalry that had outnumbered them by fifty percent just two months 
before.
70
 His efforts paid dividends later that month, when the improved Union cavalry 
contributed to the destruction of Morgan’s cavalry during his “Great” Ohio Raid. 
The purpose of Morgan’s incursion, like previous raids, was to retard a Union 
advance before it began by cutting off Federal supply lines. Although his orders restricted 
him to Kentucky, the cavalier had other ideas. Deciding that a Kentucky raid would be 




Facing an attack on their home territory, Union officials reacted with considerable 
vigor. Alert Union scouts had observed Morgan’s force crossing the Cumberland River in 
Kentucky, so the raider was followed from the start. Northern commanders were 
therefore unsurprised when Morgan unwisely crossed the Ohio River into Indiana on July 
8, a few days into his raid. Having lost the advantage of surprise, the Confederates would 
now face organized resistance wherever they went. In addition to his pursuers, Governor 
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Oliver P. Morton of Indiana quickly called for all able-bodied men to join the militia, and 
within days there were 65,000 Indiana men swarming the hills and garrisoning the towns 
in their assailants’ path.
 72
  Although they were usually easily dispersed by the invaders, 
every skirmish (and now there was often several each day) cost Morgan more men, and 
crucially, more time.  
Meanwhile, Major General Ambrose Burnside, commander of the Department of 
Ohio, coordinated regular and militia soldiers to cut off Morgan’s rear, blocking a 
southern retreat, and dispatched 8,000 Federals under Major General Henry M. Judah to 
hunt down Morgan’s smaller and now beleaguered command. Harried by local resistance 
and forced to adopt a brutal pace to escape the copious forces the Union arrayed against 
them, Morgan’s men and mounts broke down rapidly. As Shelby Foote summarized, 
“What had begun as a raid, a foray as of a fox upon a henhouse, had turned into a foxhunt 
– and, hunting or hunted, Morgan was still the fox.”
73
 
Driving their foe before them, the Union repeated their strategy as the irregulars 
entered Ohio. Once again militia barred the Rebels’ progress, while gunboats and more 
militia were sent to guard fords the riders might use to escape. Judah’s command 
continued its aggressive chase, “gobbling up” stragglers, who now numbered several 
hundred. Hemmed in by the array of forces that had surrounded it, Morgan and the 
remnants of his command were finally captured a month after they had begun their foray, 
near West Virginia’s panhandle.
74
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Morgan’s 1863 raid had failed for several reasons. First, the northern high 
command had used a combined arms approach in subduing the raiders and sealing off 
their escape with a combination of gunboats, home guard units, and Federal cavalry. Cut 
off from the South and closely pursued, Morgan was forced to plunge deeper into enemy 
territory in his effort to withdraw. Successful raids depended on maintaining the 
initiative, and through the Union’s response to Morgan, this was denied. The 
improvement of the quality in Union cavalry was demonstrated by their ability to pursue 
the raiders, and their constant aggressive maneuvering. Whereas earlier in the war 
northern cavalry had been derided for their lack of initiative and frequent defeats at the 
hands of their southern cousins, better training, equipment, and numbers now began to 
mold them into a true fighting force.  
Morgan himself shares responsibility for his defeat. His lack of caution alerted his 
foes to his intent, and his overconfidence led to the poorly planned, reckless raid in the 
first place. Instead of aborting or modifying his plan once he had been discovered, 
Morgan continued his expedition knowing full well he had lost the element of surprise. 
Even worse, by raiding a northern state Morgan forfeited the popular support he enjoyed 
in Kentucky and was instead confronted by a hostile population that actively resisted him.   
General Braxton Bragg, in a rare moment of insight, told President Davis that 
“General Morgan was an officer with few superiors, none, perhaps, in his own line, but 
that he was a dangerous man, on account of his intense desire to act independently.”
75
 
The destruction of Morgan’s cavalry deprived the South of one of its most powerful 
irregular tools, and its absence allowed Union General Ambrose Burnside to detach 
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substantial numbers of men (perhaps 15,000) that would have otherwise been tied down 
defending the railroads and depots of Tennessee and Kentucky against Rebel cavalry.
76
  
Although improved cavalry performance and better communication between 
different armed services improved the effectiveness of Federal responses to raids, the 
general raiding strategy remained a potent threat, albeit with now increased risks. Forrest 
remained active throughout 1863 and early 1864, instigating a series of Union counter-
raids expressly designed to destroy Forrest’s command. Instead, Forrest not only defeated 
these attacks, but continued to raid in between the incursions. Throughout his campaigns 
and into 1865, Sherman would display a firm respect for Forrest that was reflected in his 
actions and writings.  
In February 1864, after the successful conclusion of the Chattanooga campaign 
that pushed the Confederates out of Tennessee, Sherman launched his Meridian 
Campaign, hoping to capture Meridian’s important instillations and perhaps threaten 
Alabama. There were however, additional considerations to the campaign. “A chief part 
of the enterprise,” Sherman wrote in his memoirs, “was to destroy the rebel cavalry 
commanded by General Forrest, who was a constant threat to our railway 
communications in Middle Tennessee.” The officer candidly added that “I wanted to 
destroy Forrest, who, with an irregular force of cavalry was constantly threatening 
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 To this end, Sherman detached General Sooy Smith and 7,000 cavalry and 
twenty artillery pieces to bring the raider to heel. When his command met the bulk of 
Forrest’s 2,500 men at West Point, Mississippi on February 21, Smith lost his nerve and 
began a retreat. Forrest attacked his rear guard, breaking the Federal lines at Okolona and 
continuing a running fight that lasted eleven miles. Smith’s men, thoroughly humiliated, 
retreated back into Tennessee instead of joining Sherman as ordered. Despite the Union’s 
cavalry reforms of 1863 and their superior numbers, the Federal cavalry had been 
defeated again. Smith reported his losses over the course of his fifteen day foray as 700, 
while Forrest lost 144.
78
 Though this counter-raid had failed, the tactic would be repeated 
against Forrest as his foes struggled to negate the raiding threat. Ultimately, the Union 
strategy of counter-raids, the North’s most potent offensive response to cavalry raiders, 
would have mixed success in hindering the southern horsemen.      
 Three months after the Sooy Smith Expedition, in May, Sherman began one of 
the most decisive campaigns of the war, the Atlanta campaign. Confederate General 
Joseph E. Johnston did not dare to attack Sherman with half as many men. Instead, he 
ordered Forrest to attack the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad in central Tennessee 
upon which Sherman almost exclusively relied. Once again though, Forrest’s irregular 
role was thwarted by conventional concerns. In early June, Sherman sent an even larger 
expedition of 8,500 men of all arms to destroy, or at least distract, Forrest. In this he was 
aided by the Confederate High Command. President Jefferson Davis, refusing to abandon 
Mississippi to what looked like a full-on invasion, countermanded Johnston’s wishes and 
ordered Forrest to defend against Samuel D. Sturgis’s small army. By doing so, Davis 
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unwittingly fulfilled Sherman’s goal of keeping Forrest occupied, instead of ignoring the 
offered bait and continuing irregular operations.
79
  
 On June 10, 1864, at Brice’s Crossroads, Forrest defeated this latest attempt to 
permanently neutralize the raiding threat he represented. There, with a force half the size 
of his foes, Forrest displayed once again that, although an irregular, he was the tactical 
equal of most commanders in either army. Surprising Sturgis by attacking unexpectedly, 
Forrest hurled his force at the enemy’s cavalry (alone the size of his whole command), 
defeating them before their infantry support could arrive. Forrest attacked the infantry in 
turn, sending cavalry to their rear while aggressively attacking at close range with his 
artillery and dismounted cavalry. The invaders retreated less 2,165 men, compared to 
fewer than 500 southern casualties.
80
  
 In frustration, a few days later Sherman sent yet another, larger force of 14,000 
men under A. J. Smith and Joseph Mower into Mississippi for Forrest, promising to make 
the latter a major-general if he succeeded.
81
 Under the command of Stephan D. Lee, a 
small Confederate army, including Forrest’s troopers, was defeated at the Battle of 
Harrisburg. Sherman need not have worried, for Davis still refused to countenance 
releasing Forrest into the rear of Sherman’s army and away from Mississippi’s defense. 
Because of this, the Union strategy of offensive counter-raids to tie down Forrest did 
achieve limited success, in that he was prevented from disrupting Sherman’s campaign in 
Georgia.  
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 Some realized that cavalry raids were Atlanta’s best protection. Generals 
Johnston, Howell Cobb, and Joseph Wheeler again asked permission to unleash raiders 
behind the Union lines, while Georgia Governor Joseph Brown begged the president to 
better use Forrest’s talents: “Could not Forrest or Morgan, or both, do more for our cause 
in Sherman’s rear than anywhere else?” Brown continued his argument: 
He brings his supplies from Nashville, over nearly 300 miles of railroad, 
through a rough country, over a great number of bridges. If these are 
destroyed, it is impossible for him to subsist his large army, and he must 
fall back through a broad scope of country destitute of provisions, which 
he could not do without great loss, if not annihilation.
82
  
Another letter to Davis a few days later reiterated that “The whole country expects this, 
though points of lesser importance be for a time overrun. . . .We do not see how Forrest’s 
operations in Mississippi…interfere with Sherman’s plans in this state, as his supplies 
continue to reach him.”
83
 Such pleas fell on deaf ears, and the city fell on September 2, 
1864. 
 Though Forrest executed successful raids before and after Sherman’s Atlanta 
Campaign, the opportunity for maximum strategic impact was denied to him because of 
his relegation to a conventional defense of territory. If the Confederate political 
leadership had not decided on a conventional defensive posture, the Union counter-raids 
could have been ignored and denied their disruptive effects. Instead Davis, himself a 
Mississippian, refused to abandon his constituents in the Deep South to apparent 
conquest. Like many West Pointers, Davis did not believe irregulars could be decisive. 
To the southern president, only a large regular army like John Bell Hood’s could produce 
                                                          
82
 Jack Hurst, Nathan Bedford Forrest, 197-8; Davis to Johnston, July 11, 1864, United States War 
Department, Official Records, Ser. 1, vol. 38, pt. 5, 875; Gov. Joseph Brown to Davis, June 28, 1864. 
83





the damage necessary to draw Sherman out of Georgia and threaten Lincoln’s reelection. 
Raiders generally, and Forrest specifically, were still potent, as demonstrated by the 
continued apprehension Union commanders held for him. Considering Forrest a greater 
threat to western Union advancement than conventional armies, Grant recommended to 
Sherman a few weeks after Atlanta’s capture that before he took any other action “It 
[would] be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a first step.” Sherman 
replied that he had already detached two additional divisions to further guard his rear, 
adding, “Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will not be able to 
threaten Georgia much.” He suggested hastening the arrival of recruits from Indiana and 
Ohio to better garrison the forts.
84
     
 To many citizens across the South, Forrest’s star shone undiminished, and they 
still looked to “the king of cavalry” for the salvation of their cause. On October 2, in 
North Carolina, Catherine Edmondston wrote enthusiastically in her diary that Athens, 
Tennessee had been taken by the Tennessean, concluding “One more blow to Sherman’s 
rear.” A few days later she described how Forrest was capturing supplies “until their 
number seems to be legion.”
85
 The same week in Virginia, Confederate surgeon Spencer 
Welch wrote to his wife “Grant is evidently doing his best for Lincoln’s reelection. . . . I 
hope to hear good news from Forrest.”
86
 The Chattanooga Daily Rebel ran an article 
under the headline “How They Dread Forrest” to relate the following anecdote: When a 
southern lady inquired of Union General Benjamin Grierson why he had not attacked 
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Forrest, the officer supposedly replied, “Madame, our entire force of 7,000 cavalry would 
not fight one of Forrest’s brigades unless our infantry was there to support them. No one 
of our brigades would fight one of his regiments. No regiment a company, and no 
company would charge a pair of Forrest’s old boots if they were laying in the road.”
87
 
 As the conventional armies of the South surrendered in 1865, some feared what 
would happen if irregulars like Forrest continued their asymmetric warfare. General 
George Thomas threatened that if Forrest continued to fight “the States of Mississippi 
and Alabama will be so destroyed that they will not recover for fifty years.”
88
 A northern 
private wrote that “Forrest was our most gallant opponent, whom we have fought with 
varying fortunes for the last three years through Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Georgia. He is a born leader of cavalry men, the only man left in the Confederacy who 
need be feared as a guerrilla chief.”
89
 Sherman had come to similar conclusions. 
Demonstrating just how disruptive organized irregular warfare had been, Sherman 
confessed to Grant that “I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse, and instead 
of dealing with six or seven States we will have to deal with numberless bands of 
desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know 
not and care not for danger and its consequences.”
90
 Sherman need not have feared 
however, for Forrest had no intention of continuing the war after Johnston surrendered 
his army. Because he had not been defeated, Forrest at first resisted the idea of surrender, 
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preferring exile in Mexico. Refusing to leave his men behind however, the Confederate 
officer finally accepted terms on May 3, 1865.  
 More than any other form of irregular warfare, the Confederate government had 
endorsed cavalry raiders. During the war, a few thousand riders under Morgan, Forrest, 
and a handful of other leaders had often contested the Union advance more effectively 
than tens of thousands of soldiers in traditional armies. Major General Dabney Maury 
spoke a truth reflective of cavalry raiding in general when he told Forrest, “of all the 
commanders of the Confederacy you are accustomed to accomplish the very greatest 
results with small means when left to your 
own untrammeled judgment.”
91
 Yet despite dramatic successes, strong elements of the 
Confederate High Command resisted a systematic raiding strategy as a viable defense. 
Like other forms of irregular warfare, the initiative for cavalry raiding came exclusively 
from field commanders and the practitioners themselves.  
 When Bragg said Morgan “was a dangerous man, on account of his intense 
desire to act independently,” he was reflecting a typical West Point fear that by 
encouraging raiding, southern commanders would lose control of resources they needed 
to concentrate against the superior materiel of the enemy.
92
 The same officer accused 
Forrest of a lack of cooperation, saying his escapades did not benefit his army.
93
 To men 
like Bragg, irregulars were not real soldiers, just fighters who could not take direction. 
The “untrammeled judgment” that Maury endorsed was the last thing professionally 
trained soldiers like Bragg and Davis wished to grant. Raiders were therefore mostly used 
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and organized ad hoc instead of systematically. Thorough students of Napoleon, many 
West Pointers on both sides were committed to a framework of concentrating maximum 
resources in order to destroy the field armies of the enemy in conventional battle. This 
was the antithesis of a prolonged irregular campaign against an enemy’s supplies and will 
to win.
94
 In refusing to countenance a raiding strategy during the Atlanta Campaign, 
Davis forfeited an opportunity that Grant later reflected “promised the best results of 
anything he [Davis] could have done.”
95
 
 In fairness, the same personality traits of individualism and aggression that 
made raiders good irregulars could make them bad soldiers. Cavalry raiders had been 
better accepted and more widely adopted than other irregular warriors because they could 
be more easily controlled. When raiders disobeyed, it seemed to confirm that they were 
unreliable. And unlike partisans or guerrillas, there could be serious military 
consequences if a raiding party was destroyed. While two hundred partisan rangers did 
not represent a great investment, 3,000 cavalry troopers did, even if they were largely 
equipped at the enemy’s expense. After Morgan’s cavalry was destroyed, Union 
commanders knew they need not fear additional raids any time soon, and could therefore 
devote fewer troops to the rear. Like other irregulars, raiders usually enjoyed greater 
mobility than their foes, allowing for frequent escapes. Unlike partisans and guerrillas 
though, raiders had to keep their commands intact (rather than dispersing them among the 
populace) and return to their own lines. While raiders could achieve a level of destruction 
unrivaled by other irregulars, the sources of this power (their size and greater 
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conventionality) made them brittle, in that they could be more easily destroyed or 
diverted from their irregular purpose by Confederate decision-makers. 
 In pursuit of a logistical strategy, cavalry raiders were unrivaled. They were 
directly responsible for the defeat of two major offensives in the West in 1862, where 
long supply lines invited such a stratagem. Furthermore, Federal commanders could 
never fully abandon their reliance on these lines, though they tried to mitigate them 
through stockpiling supplies and living off the land. The initiative thus remained with the 
raiders, unless, as often occurred, they were subsumed into conventional activities. 
 In tying down great numbers of troops, the raiders were also successful. While 
Confederate armies were deprived of the conventional services of a few thousand 
troopers while they were raiding, this was more than compensated by the increased 
commitment of Federal resources to the rear, both in a permanent capacity as well as in 
temporary pursuit of the intruders. This occurred not just in Buell’s failed offensive but 
also later against Rosecrans and Sherman. The latter was so worried about the raiders’ 
destructive potential that he committed vast resources to his rear. As Sherman marched to 
Atlanta with his field army, an incredible 68,000 men were protecting his lines 
(stretching all the way back to Louisville) from irregulars.
96
  
 Cavalry raiders enjoyed equal success in fulfilling the principle of erosion.  
Certainly the material cost-benefit ratio of raiding operations (with the exception of 
Morgan’s Ohio Raid) greatly benefitted the South, as thousands of Union soldiers were 
killed or captured for often slim losses. Financially too, raiding caused countless millions 
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of dollars worth of damage to the North. Even more important and successful was the 
psychological aspect of erosion. As cavalry raiders operated successfully behind the 
enemy, they regained for the Confederacy a degree of initiative denied to it by its 
defensive and retreating armies.  The victories of Morgan and Forrest were followed by 
newspapers of both sides as closely as the movements of major armies. Southern morale 
was often fortified when raiders provided the South with its only visible victories in the 
West. Union soldiers and officers were in contrast frazzled by an elusive opponent that 
could only be limited, not decisively defeated.       
 Although the Confederacy had not made a conscious effort to pursue an 
organized raiding strategy, the success of such actions hampered Union conquest in the 
West as much or more than conventional southern armies. Raiding, like other irregular 
forms of warfare, presented northern commanders with a problem that they could not 
fully solve or, perhaps, understand. That they achieved so much in light of the restricted 
nature of their operations evidences a greater hypothetical potential to alter the fortunes 
of war.    
 
 
Chapter Two: Partisan Rangers 
It was the night of March 8, 1863 when John Singleton Mosby and two dozen 
men entered the town of Fairfax, Virginia. Although it was the young officer’s first 
independent command, and the town was surrounded by several thousand Union troops, 
the Confederate soldiers had skillfully avoided enemy pickets before masquerading as 
Yankee cavalry to bypass enemy patrols. Impersonating dispatch riders with a message 
for the commanding Union officer, General Edwin Stoughton, Mosby and a few men 
entered his headquarters and captured the general in his bed! To discourage resistance 
from their prisoners, Mosby disguised their true numbers and told the general that 
General Jackson was in control of the town.
1
 The Rebels successfully escaped with the 
general and thirty other prisoners in tow. The first of many such daring forays, such a 
humiliating incident set the tone of partisan warfare in Virginia for the rest of the war.  
With often no more than a hundred men at any one time, Mosby and his irregulars 
effectively contested the Union occupation of a sizable swath of northern Virginia, 
despite its proximity to the United States’ capital. By using irregular methods and tactics, 
the partisan rangers achieved results totally disproportionate to their numbers. This 
success was not limited merely to tactical or operational victories, but, most importantly, 
was also displayed in the tangible impact on the respective morale of the forces engaged; 
undermining Union resolve while bolstering that of the Confederate citizenry. Mosby and 
his men thus embodied the pinnacle of partisan warfare; for little cost in men and 
                                                          
1
  Mosby,“A Bit of Partisan Service,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert Johnson (New 
York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), 150-51. http://www.civilwarreference.com/articles/detail.php?article=106 





material, the Confederacy inflicted sharp military and political reverses on a foe that 
possessed much greater resources.
2
   
 Partisan rangers could in theory achieve all principles of irregular warfare; 
thwarting enemy advances by the disruption of supplies, and undermining their 
psychological and material capability to continue the war through the constant small 
victories they achieved. Professor Francis Lieber, the legal expert consulted by the Union 
War Department to define the parameters of lawful conduct and combatants of war, 
recognized these functions when he wrote: 
The partisan leader commands a corps whose object is to injure the enemy 
by action separate from that of his own main army; the partisan acts 
chiefly upon the enemy’s lines of connection and communication, and 
outside of or beyond the operation of his own army, in the rear and on the 
flanks of the enemy. Rapid and varying movements and surprises are the 
chief means of his success.
3
  
These attacks served a further purpose: the diversion of troops. “The primary 
object of partisan warfare,” Mosby reflected after the war, “should be to neutralize as 
large a portion as possible of the enemy’s force by keeping up a continuous alarm for the 
safety of his communications and his line of supply. Every man detached from the front 
to guard the rear of an invading army is so much subtracted from its aggressive 
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 If successful, these diversions could help rectify the great imbalance of 
manpower that existed between North and South. Partisan rangers like Mosby and John 
McNeill utilized the “rapid and varying movements and surprises” Lieber described to 
take advantage of the inherently vulnerable state of logistical installations that stretched 
all the way from the enemy’s field armies to the source of supplies, potentially hundreds 
of miles away in theoretically friendly (or at least occupied) territory. As Mosby said; “A 
small force moving with celerity and threatening many points on a line can neutralize a 
hundred times its own number. The line must be stronger at every point than the attacking 
force, else it is broken.”
5
 Partisan rangers demonstrated this inherent strength throughout 
the war. 
Partisan rangers in the Confederacy were organized under the auspices of the 
Partisan Ranger Act. Enacted on April 21, 1862, the law was intended to control and 
direct the efforts of guerrillas already waging war in the Trans-Mississippi Department. 
As one historian describes them, “Bands of bushwhackers had sprung up spontaneously 
all along the border among Southerners trapped behind Union lines. . . . In 1862 the 
Confederate government sought to license and therefore control these bands under the 
Partisan Ranger Act.”
6
 Rather than trying to expand irregular warfare, the Act was 
actually meant to limit its dimensions, a reality the Confederate War Department freely 
acknowledged. In fact, the government had from 1861 refused to accept many companies 
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that volunteered for “independent service.”
7
 While intended to control units in the 
western reaches of the Confederacy, the most effective partisan rangers operated in the 
East. 
For enterprising regulars like Mosby or McNeil though, the act allowed a 
previously impossible display of initiative. Under the Act, authorized officers could form 
company to regiment-sized bands of rangers. These men were to be enlisted, “and subject 
to the same regulations as other soldiers.”
8
 As an incentive to focus on military targets 
and discourage looting (guerrilla weaknesses), any equipment the partisans captured 
could be sold back to the Confederate War Department.
9
 While Mosby believed this 
profit-motive was crucial to the morale of his command, it also encouraged Union 
commanders to view these irregulars as brigands, indistinguishable from the guerrilla 
marauders operating in the West. None the less, the Partisan Ranger Act, in holding 
partisan commands to the same standards of discipline and conduct as regular soldiers, 
reflected Leiber’s own views about their legitimacy when he concluded that despite their 
irregular tactics partisans were “part and parcel of the army and, as such, considered 
entitled to the privileges of the law of war, so long as he does not transgress it.”
10
 
Simply put, partisan warfare contested what would otherwise have been the 
unchallenged occupation of Confederate territory. That physical territory itself played an 
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important part in the conduct of partisan operations. Although partisan operations were 
conducted throughout the South, they were at their most visible, and effective, in the 
occupied areas of northern Virginia, the Shenandoah Valley, and the South Branch 
Valley of modern-day West Virginia’s eastern panhandle. In these contested areas, 
political and geographical circumstances intersected to allow partisan rangers to 
demonstrate the possibilities of irregular warfare.  
The area that would become known as “Mosby’s Confederacy” during the war 
was centered around Fauquier and Loudoun counties in northern Virginia. These were 
two of the richest agricultural counties in Virginia, and the corn and wheat grown there 
helped to supply Mosby and his men. With slave populations on par with or higher than 
the rest of Virginia, the counties were unsurprisingly pro-Confederate, though there was a 
faction of Quakers and German immigrants in the eastern part of Loudoun that had 
opposed secession.
11
 Loudon County was divided by the Catoctin-Bull Run Mountains. 
Ideal regions to retreat undetected into, it was to his foe’s use of mountainous topography 
that Union General Phillip Sheridan later attributed his inability to defeat Mosby.
12
 
“Mosby’s Confederacy” therefore supplied its chief with a sympathetic populace and a 
bountiful region with ample places to hide. A scarce forty miles away from this base lay 
Washington D.C., capital of the Union. While this proximity to the military and political 
center of the foe undoubtedly insured that substantial resources would be deployed 
against the nearby irregulars, it also promised a host of valuable targets and a captivated 
audience (on both sides) for Mosby’s exploits, thereby increasing their propaganda effect.  
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John McNeill and his men were based out of Hardy and Hampshire counties. 
Located in the South Branch Valley, Hardy County was, like Fauquier and Loudoun 
counties, agriculturally rich and distinctively pro-slavery. Watered by a branch of the 
Potomac River, the county was flanked by mountains much more rugged then those in 
Loudoun; the heavily-wooded Alleghany Plateau.
13
  From this stronghold, McNeill and 
his men threatened the important Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and also often descended 
into the Shenandoah Valley to raid supply lines there. These forays were mirrored by 
Mosby, who frequently ventured beyond his base to engage in similar activities.   
For the Union, these areas were logistically crucial. Fauquier County’s 
importance lay in the presence of the Rappahannock River on its border, and the Orange 
& Alexandria railroad that ran through it. Both were irreplaceable corridors through 
which the Union delivered troops and supplies into the battlegrounds of Virginia. The O. 
& A. railroad, a frequent target of Mosby’s men, was the most direct land route from 
D.C. to Richmond, and hence subject to frequent and heavy traffic.
14
 The B. & O. 
railroad linked D.C. to the West, and funneled countless thousands of troops and supplies 
into Virginia and other theatres of war. These railroads, the most important Union lines of 
the war, were essential in delivering the material superiority of the North to where it 
needed to go. If the Union could not control these lines, the advantages it derived from its 
greater wealth and numbers would be lessened. Such important infrastructure also 
heightened the importance and publicity of partisan operations in the area.    
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Partisan ranger units could not achieve their maximum effectiveness without the 
active support of the local populace, from whom they derived recruits, shelter, 
sustenance, concealment, and intelligence. Civilian guides helped Mosby elude pursuing 
cavalry, and civilian homes boarded his troopers in between forays, thereby avoiding a 
conspicuous concentration. Mosby’s men cultivated this sentiment by sometimes sharing 
captured foodstuffs with their civilian supporters and always representing themselves as 
defenders of the people.
15
 In addition, the hostility of the populace furthered the 
occupier’s uneasiness. One Union cavalryman observed that “Every farmhouse in this 
section was a refuge for guerrillas, and every farmer was an ally of Mosby, and every 
farmer’s son was with him, or in the Confederate army.”
16
 The frustration of governing 
an antagonistic population thus further strained the morale of occupying Federal soldiers, 
who could not even feel safe in a place supposedly behind the front lines. 
Due to the independent and unconventional nature of irregular warfare, 
personality played a central role in the effectiveness of partisan units. The most famous 
practitioners, John Singleton Mosby and John McNeill, shared certain characteristics that 
would benefit their operations. Both were self-reliant. McNeill had left Virginia for 
Missouri in 1848, and prospered as a middle-class farmer nationally renowned for his 
shorthorn cattle.
17
 Mosby had studied to become a lawyer while in prison for shooting an 
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aggressive bully in college.
18
 Equally vital for detached service was the professionalism 
and discipline both men possessed, no doubt reinforced by the time both men had spent 
with the regular Confederate army early in the war (rather than as civilian guerrillas). 
This discipline allowed both leaders to hold their units together behind enemy lines, to 
focus on militarily important targets rather than civilian plunder, and in general to operate 
with speed and efficiency. Partisan rangers therefore enjoyed the independence and 
initiative of guerrillas while benefitting from the superior organization and discipline of 
regular forces. As Mosby observed, “We just maintained our individuality and at the 
same time a cohesiveness and went to the task.”
19
  
Perhaps just as important though, was the background both men lacked. Neither 
had received a military education at West Point, Virginia Military Institute, or a similar 
institution. This allowed both partisan commanders to be unfettered by conventional 
understandings of set-piece battles and campaigns that focused on destroying the enemy’s 
field forces. Instead, both McNeill and Mosby grasped that by attacking vulnerable 
targets in unexpected places, they could cause consternation disproportionate to their 
numbers. 
Mosby personally picked every man who entered his unit, carefully vetting 
would-be recruits for deserters or outlaws.
20
 This ensured the recruits accepted would be 
highly motivated and disciplined. It also minimized tensions between the irregulars and 
the conventional military, some of whom were suspicious of the ranger units luring away 
their enlisted soldiers. When such careful procedures were not followed, partisan 
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commands could be considerably disrupted. John McNeill’s failure to properly scrutinize 
his command for deserters, and his refusal to return such men to the conventional 
Confederate army, led to his court-martial in 1864. McNeill was acquitted, no doubt in 
part because of his marked military successes. When Harry Gilmor, the Maryland 
aristocrat who commanded the 2
st
 Maryland Battalion based in the Shenandoah Valley, 
allowed such men to join his partisan outfit, the result was severe discipline problems 
that, combined with Gilmor’s lax restraint, led to looting and the ire of both Confederate 
civilians and government officials.
21
  
The demographics of partisan recruits reflect both the appeal and the relatively 
broad acceptance the unconventional soldiers enjoyed in southern society. Although 
around ten percent of Mosby’s men were veterans of other cavalry units, many were 
“non-conscripts,” those exempt from military duty because of their age (young or old), 
occupation, or prior injuries.
22
 This further smoothed relations with Confederate 
leadership, as the partisans were not diminishing the front-line battle strength of their 
armies. It also maximized the cost-benefit ratio of partisan operations, by minimizing the 
manpower resources southerners risked in the irregular war.  
Recruits spanned the socio-economic gauntlet of Antebellum society, from local 
farmers and shopkeepers to the son of Virginia Governor William Smith. Eighty percent 
of Mosby’s men came from Virginia, another eight percent from Maryland, and a total of 
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twenty-eight percent came from Loudoun and Fauquier counties.
23
  Other soldiers came 
from farther afield, such as Bradford Smith Hoskins, an Englishman who had been a 
captain in the Coldstream Guards, and Private Baron Robert von Massow, son of the 
Prussian king’s chamberlain, and future leader of the German IX Corps in World War I.
24
 
The men who would become partisan rangers joined for a variety of reasons, some 
seeking adventure while others enjoyed remaining near home and perhaps profiting from 
the sale of captured material.  
When reviewing the exploits of McNeill and Mosby, it becomes clear that with a 
single operation, partisan rangers could accomplish multiple irregular aspirations 
simultaneously. Nonetheless, certain operations are particularly indicative of the damage 
partisans wrought in light of the three principles of logistics, erosion of Union strength in 
terms of material or morale, or the diversion of troops. Regardless of its military 
implications, each of these actions was executed by a comparatively small group of men, 
usually operating against great odds.   
The logistical impact of partisan ranger forays, while not as decisive as cavalry 
raiders due to their smaller size and lack of artillery, could nevertheless be considerable. 
One of the largest strikes of this nature occurred in the wake of the Gettysburg campaign. 
General George Meade, having advanced his Union army into Northern Virginia in 
pursuit of Lee, neglected to provide adequate protection for the large number of sutler 
and army wagons traveling from D.C. to his location. Over the course of two weeks, with 
less than thirty men and only seven miles from the Federal capital, Mosby captured 
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roughly 118 wagons laden with supplies.
25
 When it is considered that a single fully laden 
wagon carried 2,674 pounds of rations, the logistical toll the Confederate officer 
extracted (without loss to his command) becomes apparent.
26
  
Demonstrating the multi-faceted consequences of each foray, these attacks also 
injured Union morale, thus achieving the “erosion” principle. As so many had before, one 
northern journalist expressed outrage, tinged with wonder, at the brazen impudence of 
Mosby’s rangers, seemingly unchecked by Union authorities: 
Moseby, like Baquo’s ghost, is up and down again, and in all sorts of 
unquestionable and questionable shapes. There is no telling when and 
where he will next appear. . . .This indefatigable guerilla chief 
captured…sutler wagons…laden with goods for the Army of the Potomac. 
Information was given, and our cavalry started immediately in pursuit, 
with the usual success. . . . It is certainly very apparent that we should 
have more cavalry in this department, as it is a growing shame that this 
small band should place an embargo on our sutlers, as it really distresses 
both officers and privates.
27
  
Not only had the “embargo” distressed “both officers and privates,” it provoked criticism 
of Union decision-makers and led to calls for reinforcements, the very action Mosby 
hoped to provoke in order to divert resources away from the forces arrayed against 
General Robert E. Lee.  
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McNeill’s rangers accomplished equally impressive destruction. With a mere 
sixty men, McNeill set out from Hardy County in early May of 1864 towards the town of 
Piedmont, near the Maryland border. Not only did the B. & O. railroad run through 
Piedmont, but the town also contained extensive railroad machine shops and stores. Its 
importance was demonstrated by the telegram railroad president J.W. Garrett sent to 
Union General Franz Sigel, commander of Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley, when 
he discovered the town was threatened: 
I fear the number of troops for defense of that part of the line is too limited 
to prevent great disaster. Piedmont, as we have heretofore advised you, is 
a point of the greatest importance for working the road, the machinery, 
shops, &c., being a vital necessity for that part of the line. I need not urge 
upon you the importance in the present necessity of the Government for 
large transportation, of doing all that is possible in the prompt disposition 




Capturing the town proved to be easy, despite a telegraphed warning to Union 
garrisons stationed to the east. After detaching eleven men to halt any trains that might 
enter the town (carrying troops or raising the alarm), McNeill and his men utilized the 
surrounding overgrowth to infiltrate the town itself before surprising the small garrison 
and demanding its surrender.
29
 In less than an hour, the Rebels razed seven railroad 
shops, nine locomotives, dozens of loaded freight cars, machine and paint shops,  and 
sent another six locomotives with full steam toward the neighboring town of New Creek. 
McNeill’s small detachment had, in the meantime, captured and destroyed two fully 
loaded commissary trains, and a mail train carrying a hundred soldiers, now prisoners. 
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Thirty-four horses had also been captured. The damage amounted to hundreds of 
thousands, possibly even a million, dollars. When a slow-moving Federal detachment 
finally approached, McNeill and his men slipped away, without loss.
30
   
 Beyond its immediate and severe damage to vital infrastructure, the strike 
would affect Sigel’s campaign for control of the Shenandoah Valley. Control of the 
Valley could deprive the South of its agricultural produce, protect Washington, and 
threaten Lee’s army. Regardless, this attack, resulting from the “entire exposure of so 
extensive and important a point,” combined with the harassing attacks of Mosby upon his 
communications, forced the German officer to dispatch 800 cavalry to his rear to catch 
Mosby and, with other troops diverted from Ohio and West Virginia, defend his rear from 
future attacks.
31
 The Union army was thus slowed, allowing Confederate General John 




In August of 1864, Mosby performed another feat of logistical destruction that 
would have political and operational implications when he executed the famous “Great 
Wagon Raid” against General Phillip Sheridan’s supply lines during the latter’s Valley 
Campaign. Sheridan’s priority as commander of the Army of the Shenandoah was to 
destroy Jubal Early’s army, advance to Staunton (110 miles up the valley), and threaten 
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Lee’s position in Petersburg. Sheridan’s plan was frustrated by the Confederate retreat up 
the valley and the need to adequately protect his supply train of over 500 wagons. 
Hesitant to dissipate his front line strength through rear-guard duty, “Little Phil” only 
designated 931 men for the task, rather than the 2,000 such a mission called for. 
33
 The 
decision would provide Mosby the opportunity to conduct one of his most influential 
actions of the war. 
Once again, surprise was paramount to Mosby’s success. The slow-moving 
wagon train had become strung out over a length of three miles along the Berryville-
Harpers Ferry Turnpike, leaving dangerous gaps in its escort. Mosby, seeing this 
weakness, collected 250 men to cause havoc in the Union rear. On August 13, when part 
of the train parked near a creek to water its animals, Mosby unleashed his men. As James 
Williamson, a partisan ranger, later recalled, “The Federals did not at first seem to realize 
their situation and made no preparations to repel an assault.”
34
 After routing the small 
guard, the Confederates killed or wounded fifteen men, and captured 200 other soldiers, 
420 mules, 200 cattle, thirty-six horses, and destroyed forty-two full wagons. In exchange 
Mosby had only lost two dead and three wounded.
35
  
As had happened in the aftermath of Mosby’s other exploits, the newspapers of 
both sides rang with hyperbole, bolstering the spirits of southern readers while yet again 
embarrassing the North. The Richmond Whig reported that seventy-five wagons had been 
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captured or destroyed, and 600 mules and horses captured.
36
 A Wisconsin paper 
multiplied the number of captured wagons to 300.
37
 Other articles accused the 
government of incompetence. “Ashby’s Gap and Saicker’s Gap should be held,” stated 
Union-occupied New Orleans’ Daily True Delta. “Indeed, it was the raid of the notorious 
Mosby through the two latter, which, by some extraordinary oversight, were left open, 
that enabled him to get upon Sheridan’s communications, and, by breaking up the latter’s 
baggage train, to force him to abandon his first attempt to gain possession of the 
valley.”
38
 Another newspaper was even more damning in its conclusions: “We provide 
our Southern brethren with arms with which to fight us, teams [of horses or mules]…with 
which to haul their supplies…whilst engaged in attempting to destroy our Government. . . 
. The question naturally arises, are we in a condition to make these often repeated 
sacrifices? . . . Surely someone is to blame.”
39
 Many in the North thus doubted the 
government’s capacity to effectively wage the war. And Mosby continued to function as 
an almost magical figure that could thwart the advance of whole armies. Sheridan’s 
retreat down the Valley had been attributed, not to Early’s reinforced army, but rather the 
actions of roughly two hundred men. Despite its small size, few units on either side had 
so actively shaped battlefield dynamics or public opinion as Mosby’s partisan rangers.  
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Operationally, the “Great Wagon Raid” forced Sheridan to delegate a greater 
proportion of his army to guard duty, demonstrating the irregular principle of diversion of 
troops. Couriers were required to be accompanied by ten cavalrymen, and William L. 
Curry’s 3
rd
 Brigade, 1,800 men, was permanently assigned to wagon guard duty.
40
 One of 
the best brigades available to Sheridan, its presence, along with the thousands of other 
troops assigned to rear guard duty, would be missed in all three of Sheridan’s Valley 
campaign battles.
41
 Sheridan later admitted that “During the entire campaign I had been 
annoyed by guerrilla bands under such partisan chiefs as Mosby, White, Gilmore, 
McNeil, and others, and this had considerably depleted my line-of-battle strength, 
necessitating as it did large escorts for my supply trains. The most redoubtable of these 
leaders was Mosby.”
42
 In distracting Union commanders and consciously forcing them to 
disperse their resources in this manner, partisan rangers such as Mosby and McNeill 
demonstrated a commitment to aiding the conventional Confederate forces and 
transcending local concerns in a way that would have been impossible for guerrillas to 
display. 
 These large-scale attacks, launched to achieve the specific objective of directly 
hindering the logistical life lines necessary for a sustained offensive (the “logistical 
strategy” of irregular warfare), were accompanied over the course of the war with scores 
of larger or smaller forays directed towards other enemy soldiers and possessions. It was 
these countless strikes that embodied the “erosion” principle of irregular warfare, and 
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their impact often went well beyond their immediate material results. Although these 
attacks also often resulted in infrastructure damage and, ultimately, the large diversion of 
soldiers to the rear, these operations, unlike the previously mentioned episodes, were less 
concerned with the direct military consequences than with the “cost/benefit” ratio of the 
outcome. This was not limited merely to the physical dimension of casualties inflicted 
and dollars lost, important though these factors were. Rather, the psychological effects of 
partisan warfare bolstered southern morale while wearing down that of the Union through 
the constant embarrassing reverses they inflicted on Federal troops apparently powerless 
to stop them. It was the cumulative effects of these attacks that so frustrated northern 
commanders, and that partisans hoped would ultimately undermine the Union war effort.    
  The more visible the success, the more this propaganda component of the erosion 
strategy was amplified. Mosby’s first mission as a partisan ranger, the capture of General 
Stoughton deep behind enemy lines, was among the most politically embarrassing for his 
opponents, rivaling his “Great Wagon Raid” in how incompetent it made his foes appear. 
The incident made northern commanders look impotent and Mosby famous. One Yankee 
officer admitted to a superior that the foray “occurred eight or 10 miles in the rear of my 
command, while the Third Brigade [his own command] was not called upon to fire a 
shot. The maurauders [sic] passed entirely around me.”
43
 The subsequent increase in 
guard duty and the fear of being “gobbled up” by Mosby’s men so damaged Federal 
morale in the area that one company of the 18
th
 Pennsylvania Cavalry mutinied rather 
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than go on picket.
44
 Meanwhile, southerners rejoiced. Stuart proclaimed it was a “feat 
unparalleled in the war.”
45
 The Southern Illustrated News declared that Mosby had 
“made an enviable reputation, and is destined to achieve a fame not surpassed by any 
chief of scouts in the Confederacy.”
46
  
A few months before, on February 16, 1863, John McNeill performed another feat 
of irregular warfare that showed the disparity between the resources risked and the 
victory gained when surprise was applied. It was broad daylight when the Federal wagon 
train was attacked on the Northwestern Turnpike, several miles from the town of 
Romney. The defenders numbered one hundred and fifty cavalry and infantry, while 
McNeill led a mere twenty-two rangers. Utilizing the infamous “Rebel yell” and a mad 
dash towards the bewildered Yankee defenders, the Confederates succeeded in quickly 
putting the latter to rout. The spoils included twenty-seven loaded wagons, 106 horses, 
seventy-two prisoners, and their equipment. The rangers retired with their booty without 
injury, despite being “hotly pursued.”
47
 McNeill had captured more than three times as 
many men as the size of his entire force, along with other valuable assets. To achieve 
such ends without loss, and repetitively, heightened the corrosive affect these relatively 
small actions had on Union capabilities. Like other partisan actions, this small event 
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earned its commander widespread praise throughout the South. Lee complimented 
McNeill’s “skill and daring,” while the attack, modest though it was, made front-page 
news.
48
 Augusta’s Daily Constitutionalist exclaimed that “A few companies like 
McNeill’s, led by such fearless chieftains, would soon rid our exposed border counties of 
every abolition hoof that presses the sacred soil of the Ancient Dominion.”
49
 As their 
triumphs grew in number, McNeill and Mosby would both become heroes that many in 
the South placed their trust in.    
Few irregular actions though could rival that performed by McNeill’s Rangers in 
the closing months of the war. This partisan band had suffered a serious blow in October 
1864 when their leader was mortally wounded in a skirmish. The battalion did not 
disintegrate as might have been expected though. Instead, John McNeill’s son Jessie 
assumed command, and continued to lead these southern irregulars successfully for the 
duration of the war. Their last action of note was perhaps their greatest: the capture of 
two Union generals behind enemy lines.  
It was February 21, 1865 when the rangers descended onto the town of 
Cumberland, Maryland. The base of operations for Union efforts to protect the B. & O. 
railroad, Cumberland was the H.Q. for approximately 7,000 Federal troops. The 
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Confederates numbered only sixty-three men.
50
 A few days before the kidnapping, the 
partisan commander had sent scouts into Cumberland, and consulted a sympathetic 
railroad worker on conditions within the city, thereby learning the location of the 
commanding officers’ headquarters. Within were Major General George Crook, 
commander of the Department of Western Virginia, and Brigadier General Benjamin F. 
Kelley, the officer charged with defending the B. & O. railroad for most of the war. In the 
early gray of dawn, when the poor light could not distinguish between blue and grey, the 
attackers seized the outlying pickets before entering the town as if they were 
conventional Yankee cavalry. The pertinent houses were near each other, so Captain 
McNeill divided his command, and discreetly captured both officers in their beds before 
quickly leaving the city. Though a pursuit was launched, the perpetrators traveled over 
ninety miles in twenty-four hours to affect their escape.
51
 Both captured officers were 
later exchanged.         
 As was to be expected, the media erupted in surprise, praise, and outrage. 
Philadelphia’s The Daily Age admitted that the capture was “a complete surprise, and one 
of the most daring feats of the war.” The same article noted the fact “that two generals, 
quartered in the very heart of the town, could be seized and carried off, is one of the 
strangest things ever heard of.”
52
 The Daily Richmond Enquirer meanwhile described the 
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event as “a streak of sunshine” in what was undoubtedly otherwise a cloudy sky by 1865. 
The paper also printed Lee’s announcement of the act, in which the general praised 
McNeill and his men for their “bold exploit.”
53
  
 Like his counterpart to the west, Mosby still operated with relative freedom in 
1865 as traditional Confederate forces dissolved around him. Moreover, he remained a 
source of embarrassment to the Union War Department. After capturing yet another 
company-sized Union detachment in February, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton 
telegraphed Grant that “The frequent surprises in Sheridan’s command had excited a 
good deal of observation recently. . . . Can you excite more vigilance?”
54
 A few days 
later, Stanton was more direct, issuing a scathing rebuke to Sheridan: “The frequent 
disasters in your command have occasioned much regret in this Department, as indicating 
a want of vigilance and discipline which, if not speedily cured, may occasion greater 
misfortune.”
55
 Sheridan, the general who had won a series of notable victories against a 
corps from the Army of Northern Virginia, and had taken the strategically crucial 
Shenandoah Valley, was being made to look inept by a colonel who only led a few 
hundred men.  
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 Against such incessant stings, Union commanders reacted with a variety of 
counter measures. The eventual scale and intensity of these efforts attest to the threat 
partisan rangers posed to Union war efforts. These measures ranged from the legal to the 
physical, from passive defenses to active expeditions, and sought variously to isolate the 
irregulars from their civilian support, to destroy the raiders themselves as a unit, or to 
neutralize the effects of their forays through better security. Though varying in 
effectiveness, none could completely neutralize the threat partisans posed. 
The first line of defense against partisans was that of words and perception. 
Practiced throughout the war by northern authorities, it was in large part due to 
Confederate irregular activities, guerrilla, partisan, and cavalry raiders, that Professor 
Lieber had been consulted in late 1862 to define the parameters of legal war. Although 
Lieber’s conclusions supported the legal status of partisan rangers and cavalry raiders, 
many Union commanders and newspapers disagreed, and branded men like Mosby to be 
bushwhackers and thieves. In desperation, hostages were sometimes taken; southern 
sympathizers were put on vulnerable trains, and McNeill’s family was imprisoned during 
the summer of 1863.
56
 Neither action, legally questionable themselves, dissuaded the 
Confederates from continuing their attacks. Regardless, criminalization of irregular acts 
gave the North latitude to deal with captured partisans harshly. Ulysses S. Grant told 
Sheridan in 1864 to “hang Mosby’s men without trial,” an order that Sheridan carried out 
a number of times on captured prisoners.
57
  After one particular engagement, six rangers 
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were captured. Union brigade commander George Custer ordered them to be executed, 
one hanging body displaying a sign that read, “This will be the fate of Mosby and all his 
men.”
58
 Mosby, with Lee’s permission, executed five prisoners in turn, and sent word to 
his foe that such actions would not reoccur if his men were treated properly when 
captured. After that, Mosby’s rangers were never executed after capture, though often 
denied parole. One northern officer claimed it necessary to refuse partisan rangers 




 Legal repercussions and moralistic accusations failed to dissuade partisan actions, 
in part because Union authorities did not want to encourage reprisals against captured 
Federal soldiers, but also because partisan rangers and southern society as a whole 
recognized their efforts as legitimate warfare. Throughout the war, northern officials 
attempted to isolate the partisans from their civilian support. Private property, ranging 
from crops, livestock, and barns, to homes and towns, was threatened or destroyed in 
reaction to partisan attacks. This strategy stemmed not only from the immense tangible 
support partisans like Mosby received from the locals but also from the mistaken belief 
that Mosby and his men were guerrillas, and thus were the locals. Guerrillas were, in 
theory, an extension of the community. By exerting pressure onto the community, the 
Union leaders hoped the community would presumably curtail its own guerrillas by 
asserting social pressure.  
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Logical in its conception, this strategy bore mixed results against actual guerrillas 
in the Trans-Mississippi. In Virginia, it had even less effect on Mosby and McNeill. As is 
evidenced by their continued reliance on civilians for provision, shelter, and intelligence, 
both irregular chieftains maintained the support of the population in their area of 
operations. This was probably in large part because neither preyed upon the vulnerable 
inhabitants; even the Unionists were safe.  That the local population largely remained 
loyal and supportive to the Confederate irregulars is testament both to the former’s 
ideological resolve and the success of partisan chieftains in maintaining control of their 
men and the region.   
   This is not to say that the residents of Virginia never felt strain for their 
convictions. In February 1863, after a spate of Mosby attacks, occupying forces 
threatened the town of Middleburg with destruction if the harassment continued. When 
the citizenry of Middleburg petitioned Mosby to cease his partisan activities in the area, 
he responded with a statement that displayed both his priorities and legal acumen:   
I unhesitatingly refuse to comply. My attacks on scouts, patrols and 
pickets, which have provoked this threat, are sanctioned both by the 
custom of war and the practice of the enemy; and you are at liberty to 
inform them that no such clamor shall deter me from employing whatever 
legitimate weapons I can most efficiently use for their annoyance.
60
  
While the incident showed that there were limits to what civilians would bare, it is 
important to note that their displeasure did not dissuade Mosby from continuing his 
operations. He also continued to enjoy widespread support, even, apparently, in 
Middleburg (which was not burned down). In June that same year, when Mosby captured 
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two of General Joseph Hooker’s staff officers “a la General Stoughton,” all the adult 
males of the nearby town of Middleburg were arrested under suspicion of aiding Mosby, 
and all houses were ordered searched for hidden soldiers.
61
 Evidently the townsfolk had 
not lost their ardor for the cause, even if their direct involvement was less than the 
occupiers suspected.  
Developing parallel to the moral and legal arguments against irregulars, steps 
were also taken to better defend tempting targets such as trains and bridges through their 
fortification, as discussed in chapter one. Without the artillery that only cavalry raiders 
regularly possessed, it was often difficult for other irregulars to take blockhouses through 
direct assault. Even so, the Union found it impossible to adequately fortify all potential 
weak points, so Mosby and others often simply bypassed these areas. When they could 
not, the rangers frequently used surprise and intimidation to quell resistance or obtain 
surrender before a protracted struggle occurred. Trains were also sometimes armored and 
loop-holed to protect the troops inside from ambush.
62
 These efforts were accompanied 
by numerous patrols and the deployment of tens of thousands of troops to guard the vital 
railroads. Despite this effort, Mosby and McNeill continued their war virtually 
unchecked. Indeed, after Mosby’s famous “Greenback Raid” during the autumn of 1864, 
in which he destroyed a B. & O. train and seized a pay chest containing $173,000, the 
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Richmond Examiner smugly reported that Union General Christopher Augur, responsible 
for protecting the Manassas Gap road, could not protect the trains despite his command 
of “20,000 men,” and was “trying in vain” to catch these partisan rangers.
63
 
Scores of conventional cavalry expeditions were launched against these partisan 
rangers throughout the war, ranging in size from less than a hundred to several hundred 
troopers. But Mosby simply ambushed the smaller parties while dispersing his small 
command when confronted with larger ones. Sheridan came up with an innovative 
solution; using irregulars to fight irregulars. Accordingly, in August of 1864 Captain 
Richard Blazer, an experienced Indian fighter, was given a hundred men armed with 
Spencer repeating rifles and given the sole task of hunting down and destroying Mosby’s 
men.
64
 “Blazer’s Independent Scouts” proved a formidable adversary. Blazer used scouts 
disguised as civilians or Confederates to gather intelligence about his enemies’ location 
and habits.
65
 Recognizing the crucial advantages Mosby gained from civilian support, 
Blazer sought to win over the local populace. Through a practice of leniency and respect, 
he partially succeeded. One of Mosby’s rangers admitted that:   
Capt. Blazer was not only a brave man and a hard fighter, but by his 
humane and kindly treatment, in striking contrast with the usual conduct 
of our enemies, he had so disarmed our citizens that instead of fleeing on 
his approach and notifying all soldiers, thus giving them a chance to 
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escape, but little notice was taken of him. Consequently many of our men 
were "gobbled up" before they were aware of his presence.
66
     
 The West Virginian counter-partisan did more than “gobble up” individual 
partisans. Using the very tactics that had made the irregulars so effective, the 
“Independent Scouts” ambushed a detachment of Mosby’s fighters in September 1864, 
killing or capturing two dozen partisans.
67
 Two months later he ambushed another group 
of irregulars.
68
 As Ranger Williamson said, “It was now evident that ‘Mosby's Men’ and 
‘Blazer's Men’ could not both occupy the same section of country; one or the other must 
go.”
69
 On November 17, 1864, the southerners set a trap accordingly. Locating Blazer’s 
command in the Valley, a small group of rangers pretended to be the retreating rear guard 
of Mosby’s men. When the company-sized Union command gave chase, they were 
countercharged by two hundred mounted rangers on their flanks. Quickly routed, 
“Blazer’s Independent Scouts” were practically destroyed in the encounter, suffering a 
loss of three-quarters of their men and the capture of their leader.
70
 
 Despite spectacular successes, there were serious flaws in Richmond’s approach 
to partisan warfare. Though the Confederate Congress had passed the Partisan Ranger 
Act in 1862, the army made no efforts to train or recruit suitable candidates for partisan 
duty from its own ranks. Instead, the initiative, like most irregular activity in the Civil 
War, stemmed almost entirely from the individual partisan leaders. Given this dearth of 
direction and active support by the central government, and the Act’s preoccupation with 
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controlling guerrillas in the West, it is unsurprising that few true partisan ranger units 
were created.  
Even as early as 1862, some southerners were complaining about irregular 
excesses in Virginia. General Henry Heth wrote to Governor John Letcher that rangers 
were “organized bands of robbers and plunderers…notorious thieves and murderers, 
more ready to plunder friends than foes.”
71
 In August 1863, citizens of Winchester 
substantiated this when they petitioned Richmond to remove Gilmor’s command from the 
area due to their looting.
72
 Similarly disgusted with the opportunistic transgressions of 
these fighters, Confederate Brigadier General Thomas Rosser wrote to General Lee that:  
Without discipline, order or organization, they roam broadcast over the 
country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering and doing every 
manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror to the citizens and an 
injury to the cause. They never fight; can't be made to fight. Their leaders 
are generally brave, but few of the men are good soldiers and have 
engaged in this business for the sake of gain.
73
 
The problems extended beyond Virginia though. Nominally partisan groups, or 
marauders claiming their authority, imposed hardship on citizens throughout the South. 
In Louisiana, irregulars under Captain James McWaters ignored local authorities and 
persecuted those of suspect loyalties to such a degree that it drove many into the Unionist 
camp.
74
In Mississippi, William Falkner’s gang of misfits extended their pillaging to loyal 
Confederates.
75
 Meanwhile, in Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky, outrages committed 
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by bushwhackers claiming to be partisans in Confederate service further blurred legal 
distinctions and undermined popular support.
76
 In contrast to the residents of Mosby’s 
Confederacy, citizens of Pasquotank North Carolina decided that the resident partisans 
could offer no protection against the invaders, but rather encouraged depredations. In late 
1863, 503 citizens of the town petitioned the state capital for their removal.
77
 This 
dissatisfaction had become all too common by 1863. Even so, there remained some 
genuine, effective, partisan rangers; men who held authorized commissions, wore 
uniforms, and followed “the rules of war,” such as Col. Adam Johnson in Kentucky. 
Nevertheless, because of indiscipline, partisan warfare had become associated in military 
(and some civilian) minds with mere bushwhacking.
78
  
To a high command inherently wary of irregular warfare anyway, such crimes 
seemed to confirm their reservations. Secretary of War James Seddon acted accordingly, 
recommending as early as January 1863 that partisan corps be abolished: 
The policy of organizing corps of partisan rangers has not been approved 
by experience. The permanency of their engagements and their consequent 
inability to disband and reassemble at call precludes their usefulness as 
mere guerillas, while the comparative independence of their military 
relations and the peculiar rewards allowed them for captures induce much 
license and many irregularities. They have not infrequently incited more 
odium and done more damage with friends than enemies.  The men 
composing them would be more useful in the regular organizations.
79
 
Seddon’s writings embodied a typical West Point view of irregulars: the partisans, he 
believed, were a compromise between conventional forces and unorganized guerrillas, 
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possessed of none of their strengths and all their weaknesses. Rather than representing a 
failure in proper implementation or oversight, Seddon blamed inherent weaknesses 
within the form of war itself for its failure. 
Perhaps most damning to the partisan cause were the conclusions of the South’s 
favorite hero, Robert E. Lee. The most influential man in the Confederacy, Lee wrote to 
Richmond in March of 1864 that the problem was “it is almost impossible…to have 
discipline in these bands of partisan rangers. . . . The system gives license to many 
deserters and marauders, who assume to belong to these authorized companies and 
commit depredations on friend and foe alike.”
80
 Lee therefore recommended that all 
partisan rangers in the department, with the exception of Mosby, be disbanded and 
mustered into the regular service.  
It was these statements by Lee that Confederate congressmen cited when they 
advocated the repeal of the Partisan Ranger Act.
81
 While many who opposed the Act 
admitted partisan rangers had proved effective in Virginia, Tennessee, and North 
Mississippi, it had elsewhere hindered, they claimed, enforcement of the conscription 
laws, and proved a harbor for lukewarm recruits. Louis Sparrow of Louisiana argued that 
at a time when many Confederate regiments could only muster “a hundred fifty men,” the 
South could not afford to spare these men scattered about the country. Despite this 
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opposition, some senators believed that partisan rangers provided the surest defense of 
their states. Mr. Phelan of Mississippi claimed that in some locales, including his own, 
“the defense of the country had depended upon these bands almost entirely.” The senator 
from Kentucky agreed, positing that in the mountainous terrain of Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and Virginia, “no troops could be compared for efficiency to the partisan rangers.” Mr. 
Clark of Missouri said that partisan rangers were the only Confederate soldiers in his 
state, and that the law’s repeal would deny the Confederacy the services of thousands of 
Missourians.
82
 By 1864, these states had been denied the benefit of conventional 
Confederate protection. Irregular warfare was the only available option and, despite the 
legislation’s shortcomings, at least some partisan rangers had proven effective enough to 
encourage these politicians of their worth. Nevertheless, most southern officials 
disagreed, and on February 17, 1864, the Partisan Ranger Act had been repealed, with 
only John McNeill and Mosby’s units exempted.
83
   
 All active measures to defeat Mosby and McNeill had failed, and passive efforts 
such as fortifications could only mitigate, rather than defeat, the Virginia irregulars. For 
over two years, the irregular troopers had effectively kept the initiative against the 
numerous Federal forces arrayed against them. It therefore must have been with 
frustration that Mosby and McNeill greeted the news of Lee’s surrender on April 9, 1865. 
Although he considered continued resistance, Captain Jessie McNeill eventually decided 
to submit a month later. At first, Mosby refused to capitulate. His was an independent 
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command, and as long as there was a Confederate army in the field somewhere, the war 
would continue. Upon learning of General Joseph E. Johnston’s surrender later that 
month, however, Mosby recognized the futility of further resistance. Calling together his 
Confederate troopers one last time, Mosby disbanded the unit and personally surrendered 
on June 17.  
 Partisan warfare had shown itself capable of great feats when performed by active 
and skilled practitioners. When the results are examined in light of the principles of 
diversion, logistical destruction, and erosion of psychological and material resources, it 
should be remembered that the great majority of these achievements were accomplished 
by just a few hundred men. 
 Measured in terms of the numbers of soldiers diverted to the rear that could have 
been employed elsewhere, the partisans’ diversion strategy was undoubtedly effective. 
Besides detachments sent to the rear in reaction to specific incidents (Sigel’s Valley 
campaign, Sheridan after the wagon raid, and Sheridan’s inability to reinforce Grant due 
to Mosby’s activity) thousands of troops were re-routed to guard static possessions. 
25,000 men were diverted to protect the B. & O. railroad alone during the war, and 
thousands more to guard other railroads, bridges, and towns.
84
 The actions of McNeill 
and Mosby deserve the great share of credit for these circumstances. Though it is 
tempting to dismiss this dispersion of men as inconsequential in view of the Union’s 
ultimate victory, it is logical to assume that their absence had a great affect on the 
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planning and execution of campaigns, and therefore that their presence might have 
shortened the war.      
 Logistically, the partisans had shown themselves capable of great destruction, be 
it of railways or wagons. Such operations must be put into perspective though. While 
disruptive, these activities in and of themselves did not have the ability to derail any 
serious offensives, the way several cavalry raids did in the West. Partisan rangers, with 
their small numbers and lack of artillery, could not achieve the level of destruction 
necessary to immobilize the flow of supplies to an entire army. This was not an absolute 
law; had there been several partisan ranger units of Mosby’s quality that dedicated 
themselves to cutting Sheridan’s supply lines, they probably could have done so. The fact 
remains though that the burden of Confederate partisan warfare rested primarily on the 
successes of just two irregular groups.   
 The strategy that partisan fighters most excelled at was erosion. Under John 
McNeill, the rangers of western Virginia achieved a capture ratio of “forty prisoners for 
every man on the Ranger roster.”
85
 Mosby rivaled these figures; a northern correspondent 
told his paper that during the month of October 1864, Mosby “killed or captured 69 
Yankees, for every man he lost.”
86
 If one considers the countless horses, supplies, and 
munitions captured, as well as the extremely low partisan casualty rates in comparison to 
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the many Union men killed or wounded in each engagement, and it becomes clear that 
the Confederacy quantifiably received a very favorable investment for the few men 
(many ineligible for the regular army anyway) it risked pursuing these prizes. Beyond the 
physical realm however, the South benefitted immensely from the moral dimensions of 
partisan operations.   
Partisan activity extracted a very real political cost from Washington in the form 
of negative publicity, criticism, and lowered troop morale. The will of both soldier and 
citizen was thus damaged by the “Grey Ghost” and his companions. The South 
conversely was supplied with a new national hero, a figure that defied the odds and all 
efforts to stop him. Mosby’s small skirmishes with a couple hundred men made front 
page news in papers across the country. Even as its conventional forces were being 
defeated outside Atlanta, Nashville, and Richmond, partisan rangers continued to deliver 
noticeable victories against great odds.  This resistance helped bolster the people’s 
resolve to continue the struggle through the distressing months of 1864 and early 1865.  
 Lee’s description of unrestrained “deserters and marauders” suggests that many 
so-called partisans were in fact operating as mere guerrillas or outlaws, rather than the 
disciplined enlisted soldiers that Leiber described and Mosby resembled. Mosby, who 
had according to Lee performed “excellent service” and was “strict in discipline and a 
protection to the country in which he operate[d],” was allowed to continue because he 
was a partisan ranger in actuality, and not merely in name.
87
 The failure of the act does 
not then reflect upon the efficacy of partisan warfare but rather on the Confederacy’s lack 
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of oversight, likely stemming from the misguided view that partisan warfare should be a 
self-regulating and peripheral effort. Ironically, the proximity to both capitals, and the 
accompanying national focus this brought, probably provided the attention and oversight 
necessary to McNeill and Mosby that was generally lacking in the Confederacy’s 
irregular warfare policies. Regardless, by underestimating and underutilizing partisan 
warfare, the Confederacy neglected a potent irregular weapon that, in proportion to the 
resources committed, may have exacted a higher cost from the Union than any other form 
of irregular warfare in the war. 
 
 
Chapter Three: Guerrillas 
 
“The Ultimate results of the guerrilla system of warfare is the total destruction of 
all private rights in the country occupied by such parties.”
1
 
-General Philip Sheridan, U.S.A. 
 
When most imagine the Civil War, they picture uniformed soldiers, marching in 
formation, standing in ranks to oppose similarly arrayed adversaries. While this 
conventional image was often the case, it masks another war; a brutal war of ambush, 
murder, rapine, and occupation. From the beginning of the war, through to its last days, 
thousands of southern civilians chose to make war on their own terms. Rather than join 
the conventional armies, these men instead became guerrillas, waging what was often a 
personal war against the Yankee occupation. This mode of war, though observable almost 
anywhere the Federals occupied, was especially prevalent in the Trans-Mississippi 
Theatre, in the states of Arkansas and Missouri. For these states, guerrilla warfare, not 
conventional battles, would be the defining wartime experience of both combatants and 
non-combatants. Though initially successful, a combination of Union adaptation and 
                                                          
1
 51st Congress, 2
nd















During the war, guerrilla warfare went through two stages. The first phase lasted 
from 1861 through roughly 1863, and was characterized by ideologically motivated, pro-
secessionist guerrillas who focused their attacks on Unionists and Federal soldiers. The 
second stage, emerging in 1863 and becoming dominant by 1864, was the transformation 
of the guerrilla war from one of ideology to one characterized by indiscriminant 
predatory opportunism. The transformation was probably inevitable due to the nature of 
the war. Dispersed over thousands of miles, these Rebels who had taken up arms for local 
concerns could not be organized into a unified command capable of broad cooperation 
and discipline, be it with conventional Confederate forces or other guerrillas. As these 
realities became increasingly apparent, the Union was confronted with a region that more 
closely resembled a failed state than an enemy-controlled territory. Though the guerrilla 
war was the most widespread form of irregular warfare in the Civil War, it alone had 
proven itself impotent by the end of the war by the standards of irregular success.      
Guerrillas were a specific type of unconventional combatant, distinct from their 
also-irregular brothers, the partisan rangers and cavalry raiders. Whereas the latter two 
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categories were composed of men enlisted in the regular army, and therefore subject to its 
regulations and orders, guerrillas operated independently of the Confederate chain of 
command. Technically then, guerrillas were not soldiers; they were civilians fighting 
against the occupying Federals. When asked by Union authorities to delineate the various 
kinds of irregulars and their legality, renowned legal professor Francis Lieber described 
guerrillas as “self-constituted sets of armed men in times of war, who form no integrant 
part of the organized army, do not stand on the regular pay-roll of the army, or are not 
paid at all, take up arms and lay them down at intervals, and carry on petty war chiefly by 
raids, extortion, destruction, and murder.”
3
 Though Lieber wrote his essay half-way 
through the war, his definitions coincided with the general consensus among military 
thinkers of his era.   
It was this lack of supervision and accountability, the absence of a uniform, and a 
propensity for atrocity that made guerrillas illegal and so reviled by the conventional 
soldiers in northern, and even southern, ranks. Without a uniform, the guerrillas could 
disguise themselves as civilians to hide from their enemies, as well as pass through 
enemy lines without suspicion. Such practices undermined the distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant, and by doing so loosed the bonds of restraint between 
occupier and occupied.  
A hierarchal, slave-holding society like the South favored order, a sentiment 
mirrored by the professionally trained military men that directed the Union and 
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Confederate war efforts. These commanders were uncomfortable enough allowing 
limited numbers of enlisted men to act with comparative freedom as partisan rangers or 
cavalry raiders. Believing that their sparse manpower must be concentrated, and fearing 
the anarchy of unrestrained bands of fighters, the Confederate high command refused to 
actively pursue a policy of guerrilla warfare. The eventual degeneration of the 
bushwhackers into brigands seemed to confirm these fears.
4
 The guerrilla war arose, then, 
not out of a conscious effort of the government in Richmond (though it received the tacit 
support of some local officials), but rather organically and spontaneously from the 
inhabitants of the occupied areas themselves, areas that had been effectively abandoned 
by the Confederacy due to conventional military defeats early in the war.  
The men who became guerrillas represented the full spectrum of southern white 
Antebellum society. Some were affluent professionals or slave owners; others were 
independent yeomen or poor whites. They ranged in age from teenagers to those too old 
for active service, with a stiff leavening of military-aged men, often deserters from the 
regular army.
5
 As the Confederacy rarely occupied extensive pro-Union areas (with the 
exception of east Tennessee), no Unionist guerrilla movement of equitable scale 
emerged, though there were “Jayhawkers” in Kansas, east Tennessee, and Kentucky, and 
numerous “bummers,” stragglers, and marauders that traveled in the wake of Union 
armies and contributed to the misery of the occupied South.   
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  Motives for joining a guerrilla unit were just as varied as their socio-economic 
origins. For many, local defense was a priority. Reluctant to leave their crops and 
families unattended, these men preferred to serve their community rather than travel far 
away for months on end.
6
 Others chaffed at the regulations and orders of the regular 
army, preferring their independence instead. As one deserter-turned-guerrilla explained, 
“That kind of warfare did not suit me. I wanted to get out where I could have it more 




Revenge proved another potent recruitment tool for guerrillas. Often people 
wished to settle personal vendettas against Unionist neighbors, either for pre-war 
grievances or more recent abuses after the Yankees came. Such feuds encouraged the 
degeneration of many guerrilla bands into brigands as the war progressed.
8
 Others 
directed their hate towards the Federal soldiers themselves. Though a Confederate 
regular, General Theophilus Holmes embodied the attitude of many guerrillas when he 
eloquently informed a Union counterpart that “We hate you with a cordial hatred. You 
may conquer us and parcel out our lands among your soldiers, but you must remember 
that one incident of history, to wit, that of all the Russians who settled in Poland not one 
died a natural death.”
9
 Clearly Union occupation would be contested by such a stubborn 
populace. Jack Hinson began the war as a neutral civilian, until both of his sons were 
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executed for guerrilla activity. Subsequently, Hinson became a guerrilla himself, and 
would eventually kill thirty-six Union soldiers and sailors in retaliation.
10
 No one 
exemplified hatred as much as Champ Ferguson, a notorious guerrilla who when captured 
and tried at the end of the war was charged with fifty-three murders. Some reports 
claimed that his wife and daughter had been raped by Union troops. Regardless of the 
reason, Ferguson did seem to differentiate between his enemies: “I havn’t got no feeling 
agin [sic] these Yankee soldiers except that they are wrong, and oughtn’t to come down 
here and fight our people. I won’t tech [sic] them; but when I catches any one of them 
hounds I’ve got good cause to kill, I’m goin’ to kill em.”
11
 Whatever the reason, a high 
degree of motivation and passion was required to begin and sustain a guerrilla war, and 
this was a commodity many southerners possessed throughout the war. 
 The crucial distinction between guerrillas and other southerners fighting against 
the Union was one of identity. Whereas partisans and cavalry raiders (and many civilians 
throughout the South) had displayed an awareness of a greater shared identity through 
their concern for faraway regions and people of the Confederacy, and their generous 
support for, and coordination with, the government’s general war effort, guerrillas had 
explicitly rejected this Confederate nationalism in favor of private and local loyalties. 
While other irregulars and conventional soldiers certainly shared these local concerns, 
they nevertheless believed that devotion to the Confederacy was the best means of 
protecting their families and private interests. Guerrillas, while undoubtedly pro-
secession and anti-Union, could not therefore be characterized as “Confederate,” because 
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their existence was due in fact to a rejection of a broader national identity, displayed in 
their lack of coordination and refusal to serve in other areas. Even during the first two 
years of war, when guerrilla violence was much less indiscriminate than in would later 
become, guerrillas, while damaging to Union efforts, had shown themselves unwilling to 
be governed by Confederate authorities. 
 At first glance, Missouri’s guerrilla war seemed to defy demographic patterns. 
Contrary to what might be expected, in Missouri the frequency of guerrilla activity did 
not necessarily correlate with the presence of slavery. Guerrilla warfare was waged 
across the breadth of the state; only the North-West escaped frequent violence. While 
several counties with high slave populations, such as Jackson, Lafayette, or Saline 
counties, did host many bushwhackers, so too did Jasper and Newton counties to the 
South, each of whose population was less than five percent slave.
12
 Nor was the relative 
size or distribution of the local populace a factor; the most violent counties varied greatly 
in their population density.
13
  
 The political data from the 1860 gubernatorial and presidential elections offer 
more insight. Overwhelmingly, Missourians were wary of the new Republican Party, 
whose limited support was mainly found among the abolitionist German immigrants of 
St. Louis. Instead, a pro-South Democrat, Claiborne Jackson, was elected, with a 
Constitutional Union candidate coming in second place. The Republicans finished fourth, 
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with nearly half the votes of the third place Southern Democrats.
14
 The presidential 
election mirrored this trend, with the state narrowly favoring the Democrat Stephen 
Douglas over the Constitutional Unionists, and Abraham Lincoln garnering only ten 
percent of the popular vote.
15
      
Eighty percent of the most violent counties were, however, within fifty miles of 
the Kansas border.
16
 The bloody pre-war tit-for-tat killings between radicals in both states 
no doubt contributed to the motivation of revenge. The actions of both the Federal and 
Confederate governments inadvertently encouraged the commencement of guerrilla 
warfare as well, the latter by withdrawing, and the former by alienating the population, as 
shall be seen. The depth of this alienation is demonstrated in that many of the most 
guerrilla-infested counties had voted for the centrist Constitutional Union Party in 1860.
17
    
As previously mentioned, guerrilla forces were active throughout most of the 
state. Though the Ozarks penetrated deep in the state, offering rugged mountain safe-
havens for daring bushwhackers to retreat into, it was the Osage Plains on the eastern 
border of the state that saw the most violence. The plains were crisscrossed with 
numerous rivers and tributaries (such as the Missouri, Blackwater, and South Grande 
rivers) that served both as barriers to pursuing forces and sources of water-borne prey. 
More importantly, the Osage Plains abutted the hated Kansans to the east, perhaps giving 
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the natives more incentive to wage a personal war. When not hiding amongst the general 
population, bushwhackers could disperse in the numerous ravines, river beds, swamps, 
and woods that the terrain offered.
18
 
Irregulars in Arkansas took advantage of the relative underdeveloped character of 
their state to oppose Union occupation. The Ozark Mountains in the north, and the forests 
and swamps found throughout the eastern border and northern regions of the area 
hindered effective pursuit from mounted Yankee cavalry.
19
 Guerrillas here also enjoyed 
greater ideological support from non-combatants than the irregulars in divided Missouri, 
though there were significant communities of Unionists in the northern part of the state. 




Despite this, Arkansas was much less politically divided during the war than its 
northern neighbor. The Southern Democratic candidate received over half the vote, and 
Lincoln was not even on the ballot.
21
 Proportionately, Arkansas had more slaves than 
Tennessee, and more than twice the percentage of Missouri.
22
 Like the civilian Rebels to 
the north, the irregular war did not, however, limit itself to the area with the most slave 
owners (the southeast). The northern part of the state, home as it was to both occupying 
Federals and “galvanized Yankees,” drew much violent attention.  When President 
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Lincoln called for troops to put down the rebellion on April 15, Arkansas moved quickly 
to secede on May 6, before Tennessee or North Carolina.  
For the Union, Missouri, with its large population and industry, was essential to 
control. If southern forces, conventional or irregular, gained supremacy, the surrounding 
Union states of Kansas, Iowa, or Illinois could be threatened, and the Indian Territory 
decisively lost. Equally important from a political and military standpoint was the 
protection of the state’s own large Unionist population.  In Arkansas similar sentiments 
prevailed, with the added impetus that here especially greater Federal plans for the Deep 
South could unravel due to the threat to Union Mississippi River traffic. The Mississippi 
River offered an irreplaceable avenue of invasion and supply for Union forces attempting 
to conquer the Trans-Mississippi; therefore the Union must secure its banks.  
Guerrilla warfare in Missouri began in earnest in the first year of war, 1861. Even 
before “The War Between the States” had officially commenced, Missouri had been a 
veritable powder-keg of southern and Union sympathizers, and there had been incidents 
of violence between radical Kansas abolitionists (called Jayhawkers) and their pro-
slavery Missouri counterparts. In February 1861, the state faced a daunting choice; 
should they secede or remain in the Union? Strong cultural attachments (three-quarters of 
the population was southern) were counteracted by equally strong economic links with 
the North, thoroughly dividing the population.
23
 Governor Cleburne Jackson, though 
himself a secessionist, attempted to pursue a neutral course, at least publically like his 
neighbor Kentucky.  
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Tensions escalated, however when, on May 11, a body of state militia was 
surrounded and arrested by Federal troops commanded by General Nathaniel Lyon, who 
feared the pro-southern state militia planned to seize the arsenal in St. Louis. This 
aggressive and heavy-handed action converted many moderate Unionists into 
secessionists. A mob attacked Federal soldiers in St. Louis, and the state-militia was 
expanded. Reacting to these hostile gestures, Lyon in turn further antagonized 
Missourians when he told Governor Jackson, “Better, sir, far better that the blood of 
every man, woman, and child within the limits of the State should flow, than that she 
should defy the federal government. This means war.”
24
  
 Many Missourians took the general at his word, and violence erupted throughout 
the state. Though speaking about the war in general, one man’s declaration described the 
situation in Missouri perfectly; “This revolution is not the work of leaders or politicians. 
It is the spontaneous uprising and upheaving of the people. It is irresistible as the mighty 
tide of the ocean.”
25
  The Confederate leadership had not called for this guerrilla warfare. 
Though some Missourian secessionist leaders undoubtedly welcomed it, they still hoped 
to seize the state outright by conventional means. Governor Jackson, now overtly 
secessionist, was gathering an army of militia to this end. There were nonetheless those in 
the Confederate media who advocated the former course. That summer, the Macon 
(Georgia) Telegraph declared, “Every farmer get his weapon ready for most terrible 
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guerrilla warfare which a brave people ever carried on in defense of their wives and 
children, and their sacred liberties.”
26
 Lyon was correct; the war had indeed begun.  
The guerrillas used a variety of tactics to contest the Union’s control of their state. 
One of the most effective was the use of intimidation and violence against Unionist 
civilians. In keeping with their concept of local defense, guerrillas considered Unionists a 
threat to their community. Across the region, many of the latter persuasion had their 
homes burned, their property looted, and their male family members murdered.
27
 By 
undermining the morale and political will of pro-Union citizens, guerrillas sought to 
assert secessionist (as they saw it) control over areas nominally held by the North. The 
anarchy and violence eventually became so severe in the state that one third of the 
population chose to leave its borders during the war. Ultimately, the insurrection would 
cost the lives of twenty seven thousand Missourians of all political affiliations.
28
  
Guerrillas did not limit their attacks to non-combatants. Like irregular fighters 
throughout the ages, the southern “bushwhackers” compensated for their battlefield 
inferiority by concentrating their efforts on where the enemy was weakest. Often, this 
meant the Union’s logistical lines, whereby they obtained supplies, and their 
communications. Wagon trains, couriers, foraging detachments, patrols, small garrisons, 
telegraph lines, and trains and their tracks were all threatened by sabotage or ambush 
                                                          
26






1125BDEAA7823648@The+Heroism+of+Jackson (accessed February 27, 2013).  
27
 Michael Fellman, Inside War, 23-9. 
28
 Mark Geiger, “Indebtedness and the Origins of Guerrilla Violence in Civil War Missouri,” Journal of 
Southern History: 1. This figure does not include the tens of thousands of Missourians who fought in the 





from the citizen warriors.
29
 A northern newspaper described one such attack on a 
common target; “The train, containing troops, was suddenly fired upon from ambuscades 




 The elusiveness of their foe, a universal feature of guerrillas, was similarly noted 
by a Yankee officer: “It is impossible for any body of troops to march on them without 
their being apprised of it, and it is impossible to force them to fight unless they want to, 
for they carry little or no baggage, and can live on little or nothing. When approached 
they disintegrate and hide …until all danger is over, when they again reassemble for fresh 
deprivations.”
31
 Forced to defend fixed positions, the Union left the initiative in the hands 
of the guerrillas, despite outnumbering them almost ten to one. Until Union commanders 
could develop ways to combat guerrilla warfare, their control of Missouri would be in 
name only.  
 Guerrillas also benefited, at least initially, from the active support of some of the 
citizenry. As the Union officer quoted above observed, living off the countryside kept the 
Rebel fighters mobile. Another “blue belly” (as the Union soldiers were sometimes called 
by their adversaries), though writing later in the war, described a further advantage the 
guerrillas possessed; information from the civilians. The bushwhackers, he said, were 
“the friends and relatives of the people, and are kept informed of all that goes on in the 
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neighborhood. . . .None of the natives can be trusted as a rule.”
32
 This support provided 
the “Seccesh” (slang for secessionist) with valuable intelligence against the invaders. 
Crucially, it also enabled the Rebel citizens to hide among the general populace, 
frustrating Union efforts to bring their adversaries to battle. This further embittered the 
Federals against the population of the state.   
Guerrilla acts of ambush, assassination, intimidation and sabotage threatened, in 
time, to leave the main forces of the enemy isolated, starving, and blind. Unable to 
effectively control the countryside, unsure of where the shadow fighters were located, 
and constantly losing soldiers to ambush, the Union risked a prolonged conflict without 
visible military or political gains. Over time, the occupying armies would, the irregulars 
hoped, lose the political will to pay such a high cost in money and lives, and leave the 
state. Although the war in Missouri had only raged for three months, Union commanders 
were well aware of their precarious control of the state. 
The Union cause in Missouri took another blow when their forces were defeated 
on August 10, 1861, at the battle of Wilson’s Creek, by the conventional Confederate and 
state-militia forces under General Ben McCulloch. During the battle, the provocative 
General Lyon was killed. In the short-term, the battle could not but have galvanized the 
guerrilla activity in the state. Hence-forward though, the bushwhackers in Missouri faced 
Union commanders who took the irregular threat seriously.  
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General John Pope, Union commander of northern Missouri, had in reaction to 
guerrillas initiated retaliatory measures against the population that foreshadowed the 
“hard war” doctrine practiced throughout the occupied South later in the war. Pope 
initiated a policy whereby the citizens would pay a levy of money or property for any acts 
of sabotage or violence within a five-mile radius.
33
 Lyon’s replacement as commander of 
all of Missouri, John C. Fremont, would prove equally aggressive. Fremont declared 
martial law, and proclaimed that all civilians found guilty of taking up arms against the 
Union would be executed.
34
 By the time General Henry Halleck took command in 
December, the destruction of bridges, telegraph lines, and railroads had become so severe 
that Halleck declared anyone caught in the act of sabotage would be shot.
35
 Unionists, 
encouraged by such policies, took action too. The New York Times reported just how far 
these social tensions had escalated:  
The secessionists have, for some time past, been very unruly. . . . 
Accordingly, the secessionists, who had just been indulging in getting up a 
private reign of terror in the town of Maryville…were quietly surrounded, 
and the whole gang, about seventy of them, taken prisoners. Twenty of 
them took the oath of allegiance to Abraham, and the rest were trotted out 
to be hung, as they did not wish to for-swear Lucifer Jackson, for all the 
enjoyments of the lap of Abraham or any other man.
36
 
Luckily for these men, compassionate soldiers from Iowa interceded on their 
behalf. Still, the incident communicates how volatile the military and civil situation was 
in Missouri at this time. Unable to effectively combat the bushwhackers directly due to 
their mobility and civilian support, the North had attempted to dissuade real and potential 
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irregulars by severe penalties and retaliatory measures against the citizenry. These 
measures had done little to slow the insurrection. Although the White House claimed 
Missouri had not seceded, in fact it was a battleground as real as Virginia. 1861 had seen 
guerrilla warfare commence with the outbreak of the conventional war between North 
and South. Strategically, pro-southern guerrilla warfare had in large part contributed to 
keeping Federal control of Missouri haphazard. 1862 would see this guerrilla war 
escalate and expand beyond the confines of Missouri, into Arkansas, another region 
whose wartime experience was defined by guerrilla warfare.  
Although the Federals experienced difficulties combating irregulars, they enjoyed 
more success in the conventional contest between armies. In early March 1862, the Union 
army under General Samuel Curtis won a decisive victory against the Confederate army 
at the battle of Pea Ridge, just over the border in Arkansas. The clash had serious 
repercussions for how the war would be conducted in the far west henceforward. With 
the defeat, the Confederate military presence in the region had all but been destroyed, and 
most of what was left of the Confederate army was withdrawn from the area to join the 
Army of Tennessee further east. Regular Confederate forces could now no longer 
properly defend Arkansas, let alone threaten Missouri.
37
  
With little organized opposition, Curtis turned his incursion into an attempt to 
conquer the rest of the state. Arkansans, receiving little aid from the Confederacy, 
embraced guerrilla warfare as the only viable option to defend their state. Although 
Missouri guerrillas would continue to harass Union forces throughout the second year of 
war, the strategic center of the guerrilla war had shifted south, as the citizen Rebels 
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attempted to counter the northern invasion. These southerners were aided by Missouri 
guerrillas and former soldiers of the retreating Confederate army. One Confederate 
officer noted an episode that occurred in numerous places in the Upper South in 1862: 
 Our men dropped out by hundreds and by thousands and remained behind. . . 
.They were unwilling to again leave all that was dear to them to horrors worse 
than war. . . .To meet and match the Federal Home Guards, and the marauding 
robber bands that belonged to neither side or army…they formed themselves into 
guerrilla bands to enable them to act more effectively.
38
 
Such a happening again demonstrated the local priorities of many guerrillas. It also, 
however, reveals circumstances that would grow steadily more significant as time passed; 
the presence of roaming bands of guerrilla-thieves that targeted citizens of both sides 
indiscriminately. Such activities would gradually undermine the whole guerrilla effort. 
The men left fighting the Yankees were far removed from the influence of the 
Confederate government, and no longer subject to its discipline.    
 General Curtis began his advance towards Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, in 
late spring of 1862. Unfortunately for the Union army, the Yankees soon found 
themselves hemmed in on all sides by swarms of “wandering marauders” and 
“railraiders.” Using the terrain to their advantage, bushwhackers conducted ambushes and 
raids in the mountains, forests, and river banks of northern Arkansas.
39
 The psychological 
effect of this kind of war was burdensome, and undermined morale; Union soldiers were 
never sure when the next attack would come, or even who the enemy was. Samuel 
Trescott, a Union cavalryman, confided to his family that “We think out here we would 
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rather be in a big fight than be shot at when we are going down the road.” Another soldier 
echoed this sentiment when he wrote that he’d “rather be killed in battle than be shot 
from behind a tree by…marauding bands of desperadoes.”
40
 With such experiences, the 
soldiers felt little compunction about living off the land during this “White River 
Expedition”; a course of action necessary regardless, because the guerrillas had in fact 
successfully cut the army’s supply lines between Arkansas and Missouri, their base.  
 In an effort to control the guerrilla war already in progress, Confederate General 
Thomas Hindman, under whose jurisdiction Arkansas fell, issued his “General Orders 
17” in mid-June. These decrees attempted to direct and exploit the guerrilla war by 
essentially turning the guerrilla civilians into enlisted partisans. Partisan rangers, while 
using tactics reminiscent of guerrillas, were disciplined, uniformed soldiers who were 
controlled by the Confederate Army and followed the established rules of war. Hindman 
asked the men of Arkansas to organize themselves into companies that would be 
“governed in all respects by the same regulations as other troops. Captains [would] be 
held responsible for the good conduct and efficiency of their men, and [would] report to 
[his] headquarters.”
41
 The Confederate Congress replicated this approach on a national 
scale by passing the “Partisan Ranger Act” a month later.
42
 Although the latter act did 
produce some skilled partisan units, most of these rangers had been conventional 
Confederate soldiers before joining. Few actual guerrillas paid heed to Hindman or 
Congress, preferring instead to follow their own orders and interests. That was, after all, 
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why they had become guerrillas in the first place. Despite the Confederate military’s 
ambivalence about guerrilla warfare, some in the media still advocated it.  The Columbus 
Georgia Daily Constitutionalist asserted “We must enter upon this and every other 
species of warfare to exterminate the foul invaders of our soil.”
43
  
Union General Curtis, meanwhile, dissuaded by rampant “desperadoe” activity 
(yet another epithet for guerrillas), was forced to divert his expedition to Helena. As 
previously mentioned, the Federals, due to their supply situation, were forced to subsist 
off the local population. Purposely targeting “Seccesh” civilians for the worst 
depravations, Curtis wrote proudly, “I leave nothing for man or brute in the country 
passed over by my army, except a little to feed the poor.”
44
 Although armies had looted 
and foraged before, Curtis’s Army of the Southwest was the first to practice a policy of 
deliberately living off the southern populace in order to damage the latter’s will and 
resources, and the event was itself directly brought on by the guerrilla war. This would 
become a standard feature of Union policy later in the war. The Arkansas insurrection 
thus had affected two strategic effects; first, it had deflected a Union advance, thereby 
limiting the North’s control to the northern part of the state. Secondly, it had explicitly 
foreshadowed the Union high command’s decision to conduct “hard war;” that is, to 
directly target the southern people’s morale and property, rather than just their armies.  
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To combat the bushwhacker menace, the Union developed a number of innovative 
counter-guerrilla devices. An added impetus to halt the “desperadoes” was the 
vulnerability of river traffic on the Mississippi. Guerrillas lining the banks of the river 
would fire into the ships as they passed, often capturing unwary boats and confiscating 
their cargo.
45
 The Mississippi River was the main artery of supply for any advance by 
Union armies into the Deep South, as well as supporting the Federal occupation of New 
Orleans. If Vicksburg, Mississippi was ever to be taken, the river would first have to be 
secured. For the North, retaliatory destruction of private property became a standard 
reaction whenever and wherever an attack occurred. Often, whatever town or houses 
stood within a few miles of the attack would be razed.
46
 In one incident that year, General 
William Tecumseh Sherman, who would later become the personification of “hard war,” 
ordered a fifteen mile swath of Arkansas to be burned in retribution for a deadly attack on 
a transport.
47
 By punishing civilians, Union authorities hoped that southerners would stop 
aiding guerrillas with information, hiding places, and supplies.  
To combat the threat against its river operations, the Union developed the 
Mississippi Marine Brigade in November 1862; a combined-arms force specifically 
designed to combat guerrillas. To counter the mobility of the elusive “marauders,” the 
brigade’s 1,200 men were mounted on mules or horses, and were conveyed on eight 
specially-designed transports.
48
 Though logical on paper, the unit’s discipline problems 
led it to specialize more in indiscriminate burning and looting than in fighting irregulars, 
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and the unit was eventually disbanded.
49
 Still, the creation of the unit in the first place 
showed that the Federal leadership considered the irregular violence important enough to 
merit a tailored and persistent response. 
Other specifically anti-guerrilla units were more effective. Previously, Union 
authorities had relied on conventional cavalry patrols to find and fight guerrillas. These 
patrols, unfamiliar with the environment and ignorant of the local people, rarely came to 
grips with their more mobile foes. Beginning in 1862, Union commanders raised local 
regiments of Unionists to serve in their area, rather than sending these men to the front to 
fight against the Confederate armies. These “tories,” as Unionists were called, knew the 
terrain. They personally knew the people, and their loyalties. Perhaps most importantly, 
they were highly motivated by personal grievances and a determination to reclaim their 
homes for the United States.
50
 The First Arkansas Cavalry was one such unit. Many of 
the families of the men had been driven from the state by guerrillas, and now the Union 




The last important tool in Washington’s anti-guerrilla strategy was the provost 
guard. These were the soldiers charged with policing the army, supervising army-civilian 
contact, and maintaining, along with garrison units, order in occupied zones. The 
guerrilla war in Missouri had honed this organization into a potent intelligence agency, 
complete with a secret service branch. Spies would infiltrate guerrilla or southern-
sympathizer circles, then ascertain the location of guerrilla bases or the identities of the 
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 The provost martial, commander of the policing organization, even kept 
dossiers on the civilians in his area. Some typical descriptions read: “A man named 
‘Hunter’ who is a rebel but not a bushwhacker,” or for another, “A Union sympethizer 
[sic] who will give information.”
53
 Armed with such intelligence, Union soldiers could go 
on the offensive against these “brigands.” Previously, mobility and information had been 
key strengths of the Rebel citizens. Through their use of spies and Unionist southerners, 
the Union was beginning to neutralize that advantage. 
 Even as the insurrection had reached its peak of strategic decisiveness, the Union 
had developed a number of effective tactics that could mitigate, though not neutralize, 
guerrilla activity. Another factor would prove even more damaging to the citizen’s 
rebellion. 1862 witnessed the widespread emergence of a new kind of guerrilla, one 
motivated solely by profit. These guerrillas, though they might have claimed a political 
allegiance, targeted civilians regardless of their loyalties. Looting was nothing new at this 
stage in the war in Arkansas and Missouri. “Bloody Bill” Anderson, an infamous 
guerrilla in Missouri, confided to an acquaintance in 1861: “I don’t care any more than 
you for the South…but there is a lot of money in this [guerrilla] business.”
54
 An anomaly 
in 1861, and a minority in 1862, brigand-guerrillas would steadily grow in numbers and 
brazenness. Amid the chaos of war, anarchy loomed.  
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Some men took advantage of the absence of law and the fluctuating political 
control of these regions to gain financially. Rival armies stripped the countryside of food, 
provoking famine and rendering many guerrillas desperate for sustenance, which they 
often stole from local inhabitants.
55
 One family that suffered such abuse in 1862 was 
“stripped of everything but what was on their bodies,” and left in a “destitute 
condition.”
56
 Already a problem in 1862, such incidents would occur with increasing 
frequency as the war progressed.  
Even pro-southern citizens began to turn against the bushwhackers. One town 
declared: “We who voted for the ordinance of secession doubly desire to express our 
disapproval of Southern guerrillas. . . . We will neither aid, abet nor harbor them nor their 
unholy actions.”
57
 By preying on civilians, these brigand-guerrillas undermined one of 
the crucial supporting structures of their method of war. Without civilian support, the 
guerrillas would find it much harder to operate in secret. Soon, they would have to fight 
not just Unionists or Federal soldiers, but the Confederate army as well, acting in defense 
of its citizens. As one guerrilla already stated, these men “wanted to be their own 
generals.” Such independence could not be controlled or coordinated. The guerrilla 
uprising would soon become a liability for both sides of the war, and the seeds of its 
destruction had already been sown.   
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The guerrilla war in 1863 reflected both the newly-internecine nature of the 
struggle as well as the continued brutality of the conflict. Although Missouri and most of 
Arkansas were under occupation, the countryside of both remained plagued by guerrillas. 
One of the most infamous guerrilla raids of the war occurred on August 21, 1863 in 
Lawrence, Kansas. The chieftain of the Missouri perpetrators was William Quantrill. 
Indicative of the varied origins of guerrillas, Quantrill was a middle-class school teacher 
from Ohio. Relishing in the violence of irregular warfare, he had begun the war as a 
northern “jayhawker” before switching his allegiance. Like many guerrillas, the outlaw 
attempted to garner legitimacy for his actions by falsely claiming to possess an officer’s 
commission in the Confederate army. Quantrill led one of the largest guerrilla bands in 
the state, and caused mayhem among Unionists and northern soldiers by ambushing 
trains, burning homes, and murdering captured soldiers and sympathizers. Union officials 
found Quantrill’s terror activities so disruptive that they held five female relatives of his 
men hostage. Tragically, the structure in which the women were housed collapsed, killing 
some of the prisoners. In retribution, Quantrill led five hundred men over the border to 
Lawrence, Kansas, an abolitionist stronghold. There, they murdered one-hundred fifty 
men and boys and fired the town.
58
 The foray, apart from exemplifying the vicious terror-
tactics of guerrillas, proved that they remained a potent threat.  
 The cycle of vengeance was not yet over. In perhaps the most drastic reprisal of 
the war, Union General Thomas Ewing, commander of the department, issued a decree 
ordering the complete depopulation of three and a half counties of Missouri near the 
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 The twenty thousand inhabitants of this region were forced to leave their homes, 
most of which were then destroyed.
60
 The series of events that cumulated in the 
indiscriminate banishment of thousands of people is indicative of the escalation and 
retribution inherent in a guerrilla war.  
For the Confederacy, ending such guerrilla excesses became essential in 1863. 
The Union armies had steadily advanced into middle Tennessee, and in July, the South 
suffered the twin reverses of Vicksburg’s capture opening the Mississippi River and 
General Lee’s repulse at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The former defeat hindered 
communication between the western and eastern halves of the Confederacy, while the 
latter damaged the South’s hopes of recognition abroad. With these reverses in the 
conventional war, the Confederacy had to ensure the morale of its armies and citizens 
more than ever. Every time a guerrilla looted a citizen, the Confederacy appeared 
impotent to its people, as well as to observers in the North and abroad. Also, the South 
had suffered heavy casualties after years of fighting, and begrudged the number of 
deserters who left its undermanned armies for the sake of personal gain. In addition, such 
depredations encouraged a severe response by the Federals, and angered Confederate 
soldiers who worried about their families. One Rebel soldier expressed a sentiment many 
of his peers felt about guerrillas in general: “Those guerrilla bands of ours that swarm 
around Memphis I think caused those people who live around there an immense deal of 
trouble, whilst they are doing the cause scarcely any good at all.”
61
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Accordingly, the Confederate military took active measures to suppress outlaw 
guerrillas. The attempt to incorporate guerrillas into the regular army in 1862 via the 
Partisan Ranger Act had failed. Now direct force was necessary. In regions too far behind 
enemy lines, such as Missouri, this was not possible. But in areas within reach of 
Confederate forces; along the frontier in southern Arkansas or middle Tennessee for 
example, southern commanders issued specific orders aimed at curtailing illicit guerrilla 
activities. One Confederate officer wrote in November of that year: “Gross and repeated 
outrages have been committed upon persons and property of civilians. . . . The most 
stringent measures alone can check them.”
62
 Frequently, confrontations between 
Confederate authorities and bushwhackers ended in pitched battle.
63
 Confederate General 
William Steele, commander in Southern Arkansas, reported that he was forced to commit 
an entire regiment of cavalry to combating irregulars “who were committing daily deeds 
of violence and bloodshed.”
64
 Soon, the Confederates emulated the Union’s practice of 
executing any brigand-guerrillas they captured.
65
 Though traditional guerrillas, those who 
focused on fighting the occupying Union soldiers and Unionists, continued their attacks 
through 1863-4, this group’s efforts were slowly marginalized by opportunistic bandits.  
The Union meanwhile continued its policies of recruiting indigenous military 
units and conducting reprisals against civilian property. One Illinois private grimly 
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remarked: “Confiscation and extermination is our motto.”
66
 Sometimes just suspicion of 
being a guerrilla was enough to get a civilian killed by vengeful troops.
67
 Prisoners were 
killed out of hand. Such acts were largely accepted by Union officials who were 
frustrated by the chaos the violent revolt caused. The New York Times declared in 
September of 1863 that “Missouri is to-day more dangerously disturbed, if not more 
dangerously disloyal, than Mississippi.”
68
 Another article of that year from an Illinois 
newspaper summarized the Federal government’s position on guerrillas, as well as the 
increasingly criminal nature of the guerrilla war itself: 
They have no claims under the laws of warfare; they are out of the pale of 
their protection, placed there by their own reckless violation of those laws. 
The picking off of men here and there, and these raids upon families and 
villages, where murder and plunder are the only motives, and not in any 
sense the furtherance of the object of war, should be punished with death, 
without even the form of a trial. Let no such men be taken prisoner.
69
    
The guerrilla war of 1863 was therefore defined by increasing tension between the 
southern populace, along with its government, and the guerrillas, many of whom had 
progressively degenerated into mere robbers rather than politically motivated fighters. 
After three years, through improvisation and concerted effort, the Union was still unable 
to suppress the guerrilla war in Arkansas and Missouri, though it had considerably 
diminished its strategic impact on the conventional war after 1862. The Mississippi River 
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had been protected well enough to facilitate Grant’s advance to Vicksburg, though he 
also lessened its importance by living off the land, as General Curtis had done in 
Arkansas a year earlier. Union armies, meanwhile, advanced steadily into Tennessee. If, 
by mid-1863, the Union’s war effort was not critically disabled, Unionist and “Secesh” 
civilians still continued to suffer deprivation, murder, and intimidation at the hands of 
“independent (bushwhacker) companies” and resentful Federal troops. The 
unconventional violence also continued to be a political liability for both sides, as 
Richmond and Washington both sought to prove their credibility and vitality by 
protecting their citizens and maintaining law and order in their territory.       
Both polities carried these priorities into 1864, a crucial year in the conventional 
war. Although the Union had won great victories over the last year, occupying large 
swaths of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee, the cost had been high. 1864 was an 
election year. The Union offensives against Richmond and Atlanta appeared stalled, 
casualties were mounting, and if the northern voters considered the cost too great, 
President Abraham Lincoln might not be reelected, and a peace candidate might win 
instead. Victory could therefore not be taken for granted, and the continued insurrections 
that challenged Federal control of lands occupied for years did not radiate confidence to 
the public. Renowned military theoretician General Carl von Clausewitz famously stated 
that “War is politics (or policy) by other means.”
70
 Although in strictly military terms the 
guerrilla conflict had lost much of it decisiveness, it retained its political importance, and 
could therefore still impact the course of the war.  
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This reality was true for the Confederacy as well. Even pro-secession civilians 
were welcoming Union authorities as a safeguard against the cruelties of the bandit-
insurrectionists. This obviously undermined Richmond’s popular support and ability to 
continue the war. Like the North then, the Davis administration believed it was in its best 
interests to suppress the wanton violence in the west. Many Confederates, from enlisted 
soldiers to commanding officers, embraced the decision. One legal irregular, a partisan 
ranger captain in Arkansas, manifested in microcosm the fears and attitudes of his 
government. “There have been men in this country,” he said, “committing crimes on my 
credit, and if I find them the weather is two [sic] hot to Ride [sic] horses to headquarters 
with any such caracters [sic].”
71
 To counter the illegal combatants’ impersonation of 
Confederates when they looted, the Confederacy adopted a voucher system for any goods 
they requisitioned.
72
 Citizens could then distinguish government officials from the 
outlaws who impersonated them. In accordance with these negative views, Confederate 
authorities ordered the arrest and execution of all bushwhackers, regardless of their 
political loyalties, who had committed crimes against civilians, and commanded 
unauthorized irregular companies (guerrillas) to be broken up.
73
  
 Although northern and southern commanders often disagreed about the legality of 
certain irregulars like cavalry raiders or partisan rangers, they were in substantial 
agreement concerning guerrillas by 1864. One Union soldier, witnessing the execution of 
two guerrillas guilty of lynching several Unionists, noted that, “There can be no question 
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these two unprincipled assassins richly merited their fate, and hence it was impossible to 
entertain for them any feeling of sympathy.”
74
 A Union soldier named Lemuel Abijah 
Abbott wrote of one irregular: “[I] wonder if he thinks guerrilla warfare is manly? Some 
people are born guerrillas, though, and have no conception of honor. I’d go and drown 
myself before I’d practice that kind of warfare.”
75
 These views remained consistent with 
the statements of Union soldiers and leaders from the beginning of the war. After years of 
fighting, the Yankees had retained their disgust of bushwhackers. Summary executions 
therefore continued unabated, though the Union continued to develop inventive tactics to 
counter bushwhackers. 
 Although the Federals had successfully, though not completely, countered the 
guerrilla threat to army operations through the use of locally-raised regiments, spies, and 
area devastation, they had fallen short in protecting Unionist civilians, despite the 
presence of nearly 12,000 troops in Arkansas.
76
 A creative colonel named Marcus La Rue 
Harrison, creator of the First Arkansas Cavalry (Union), developed the idea of Unionist 
colonies, to be used in conjunction with the afore-mentioned techniques. The fortified 
settlements would shelter loyal southerners from outlaws. The sites were chosen by 
Harrison, and all living within ten miles of them were forced either to join the colony or 
leave. These agricultural villages freed Harrison of the burden of defending their 
inhabitants, as well as providing useful supply depots.
77
 Acting as “stepping stones,” the 
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communities allowed Union counter-guerrilla operations to extend their range, as they 
could rely on the resources of the colonies as they advanced deeper into contested 
territories. The area of operations for the irregulars was likewise restricted, as the 
network of colonies acted similar to a fence, hemming the guerrillas in, and lessening 
their mobility.        
  Actively persecuted by both sides, the guerrilla war had failed by the end of 
1864, in that it could not influence the final outcome of the war. Lincoln was reelected, 
Atlanta had been captured, and Richmond would soon follow in April of the next year. 
Although violence remained rampant throughout the year, the guerrillas had neither 
discouraged enough northern civilians, nor distracted enough Union troops, to prevent 
either event. Evidently, though, this had ceased to be the primary concern of many 
citizen-warriors by 1864. At the beginning of the war, the bushwhackers had chosen their 
mode of war for mostly personal reasons of independence or revenge, rather than as part 
of a collective identity like Confederate soldiers (or citizens) had displayed. By the end of 
the struggle, this self-serving mindset manifested itself in a number of thieves, who were 
more concerned with personal gain than the advancement of a political ideology. The 
confusion of authority over whom the bushwhackers answered to, and the hardships the 
destruction of war brought, encouraged such sentiment.  
In 1865, with its armies shattered and its cities occupied, the only choice that 
seemed to remain to the Confederacy was whether to dissolve what was left of its armies 
and embrace insurrection throughout the remainder of its territory, or surrender. The 
former course was what one officer suggested to General Robert E. Lee, rather than 





If I took your advice, the men would be without rations and under no 
control of officers. They would be compelled to rob and steal in order to 
live. They would become mere bands of marauders, and the enemy's 
cavalry would pursue them and overrun many wide sections they may 
never have occasion to visit. We would bring on a state of affairs it would 
take the country years to recover from.  
And, as for myself, you young fellows might go to bushwhacking, but the 
only dignified course for me would be, to go to General Grant and 
surrender myself and take the consequences of my acts.
78
 
The situation Lee described was, of course, not hypothetical, but had in fact 
already occurred in Missouri and Arkansas. Bushwhacking had already been tried, and 
the results had been immense suffering for the people. Lee’s decision portrayed a 
dichotomy between the individualistic thinking of the guerrilla and his own more 
communal views. When Jefferson Davis later enquired to his cabinet if the irregular war 
should be pursued, Secretary of State Judah Benjamin reiterated Lee’s estimation, saying, 
“Guerrilla or partisan warfare would entail far more suffering on our own people than it 
would cause damage to the enemy,” and that the southern people would not sustain such 
a conflict. The cabinet concurred with this conclusion.
79
 Benjamin’s estimation was given 
credence by an article printed in Georgia’s The Macon Telegraph, a newspaper that had, 
under its previous editor, formally urged guerrilla warfare earlier in the war. In June of 
1865 though, the Telegraph endorsed the words of Methodist Bishop Paine, who urged 
his countrymen to “not yield to the temptations to carry on guerrilla warfare, which we 
have ever regarded as wrong in principle. Such a warfare, moreover, would result in no 
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good, but bring great and continued distress upon the country.”
80
 Both the leadership and 
the people of the Confederacy had rejected guerrilla warfare. Though lawlessness would 
prevail in some parts the aftermath of the war, there would not be a mass-insurrection of 
the entire South. The war was over. 
Why, in such a vast and rugged territorial expanse, populated by a determined 
people, had guerrilla war not succeeded? The military policy of the Union played an 
important role. Recognizing the threat and disruption from guerrillas, the Union altered 
its occupation policies to better combat the Rebel civilians. A large part of this policy was 
retributive burning and confiscation, which would become standard policy throughout the 
occupied South. Alongside these widely-dispersed measures however the Union also 
developed more precise counter-guerrilla tools, such as the provost-martial’s spy 
network, and locally-raised anti-guerrilla units. That the guerrillas instigated this great 
change in methodology is proof of the chaos they caused.  
More critical than the Union’s countermeasures though was the movement’s own 
internal failings. As countless observers, North and South, had noted, the guerrillas could 
not be controlled, and preyed on friend and foe alike. The wild independence of the 
perpetrators disallowed for a concerted effort on their part, and invited abuse of non-
combatants. Had the South waged a state-wide insurrection, the Union would have faced 
not a united Confederacy, but rather countless smaller, private wars. Though frustrating, 
such a dispersed effort could not have defeated a determined, unified North, especially 
since southerners likely would have turned against the guerrillas. Where guerrilla war did 
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happen, in Missouri and Arkansas, this reality became apparent. There was no organized 
command structure of the Rebel bushwhackers. Rather, numerous bands fought who, 
where, and when, they chose. When they chose to abuse the civilians who offered them 
food, shelter, and intelligence, the irregular fighters undermined one of the crucial 
advantages their mode of war possessed. Besides depriving themselves of these services, 
the bandits drew the ire of the Confederacy itself and most of its citizenry, despite its 
supposed support of their cause. 
While the guerrilla war initially succeeded in performing all three functions of 
irregular warfare (diversion, logistical destruction, and erosion of enemy willpower), 
these internal shortcomings destroyed their decisiveness. The jealously-guarded 
independence of various groups of bushwhackers, combined with a complete lack of any 
unifying war aims, fore-ordained the movement to incoherence. Without cooperation 
with each other, let alone Confederate forces, the guerrillas could not hope to 
systematically destroy the northern occupation. This lack of structure and unity led to the 
destruction of their popular base, and with it the reversal of the advantages they had 
previously accrued to the Confederate war effort in diverting troops and eroding enemy 
morale. Since their war was so exclusively local and personal, the former had not really 
been a conscious goal in the first place.    
Though often ignored in studies today, guerrilla warfare was the primary Civil 
War experience of countless thousands of civilians and combatants in places like 
Arkansas and Missouri. Although the civilian Rebels had initially threatened the Union 
war effort, by the time the conventional forces of the Confederacy had lost, so too had the 





As the military theoretician Antoine Henri Jomini wisely concluded, “The spectacle of a 
spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand 
and noble which commands our admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the 
sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it.”
81
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Though rarely discussed in depth, irregular warfare was an important reality in the 
Civil War, and one that the Union never fully solved. Thousands of irregulars of all 
descriptions proved to be among the most indefatigable and successful opponents of the 
Union. In areas that would have otherwise remained uncontested, southern irregular 
warriors required the Union to invest considerable resources to maintain control of 
territories it had already “conquered,” or forfeit considerable political, material, and 
strategic capital to its enemies.   
Although the Union created some innovative counter-measures, these tactical 
innovations proved unable to decisively neutralize any of the three forms of irregular 
warfare. Despite their disproportionate and influential successes, irregular warfare was 
practiced only on a limited scale, never systematically pursued or widely adapted by 
Confederate leaders. Too often, the initiative behind irregular operations came from the 
practitioners themselves. The Confederacy’s decision not to pursue irregular activity on a 
grander scale was the chief impediment to its success.  
In the American Civil War, not all forms of irregular warfare had proven 
themselves equal. When Sherman wrote that he dreaded the Confederate armies would 
disperse and “instead of dealing with six or seven States we will have to deal with 
numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest,…and others,” 
he tellingly referred only to partisan ranger and cavalry raider leaders, not guerrillas.
1
 It 
was not civilian guerrillas like Quantrill or Ferguson that Sherman was concerned with, 
                                                          
1
 Sherman to Grant, April 25, 1865. Official Records vol. 4 





but disciplined, professional cavalry raiders and partisan rangers. These men were 
dedicated to their cause and had proven capable of consistent, effective resistance against 
great odds. Crucial for the professionally trained leadership of the Confederacy, they 
could also receive orders and coordinate their actions with other Rebel forces. In view of 
the three principles of irregular warfare discussed (erosion, the logistical strategy, and 
diversion of troops) the enlisted irregulars had proven themselves capable, despite their 
small numbers and bureaucratic opposition.  
Of all the irregulars, cavalry raiders were most accepted by the Confederate 
leadership. Raiders, as the most conventional of irregulars, enjoyed a more accepted 
status in conventional warfare than the other types of fighters. The role of light cavalry in 
logistical strikes had been familiar in the eighteenth century, and, as has been seen, was 
noted and praised by Clausewitz and Jomini as well. Cavalry raiders were therefore a 
more palatable option to the professional southern leadership because of their familiarity. 
Also important was the fact that they did not remain indefinitely behind enemy lines, so 
commanders need not permanently relinquish control of the men.  
Even so, men like Forrest and Morgan were often kept on a short leash. In part 
this was the inevitable result of their more traditional status; politicians and many 
commanders were unwilling to relinquish control of any part of a field army for extended 
periods of time. The impetus for raiding thus stemmed from the raiders themselves or 
their immediate superiors. They were not organized into dedicated and specialized units. 
As a result, raiding was an ad hoc response rather than a widespread, systematic strategy. 





importance, President Davis chose instead to consign Forrest to a conventional defense of 
Mississippi.  
Partisan rangers suffered from a similar neglect by the government in Richmond. 
More irregular than cavalry raiders, partisan rangers were also less accepted by friend and 
foe. Though to outsiders they closely resembled guerrillas, under leaders like Mosby 
partisan rangers were perhaps the most disruptive irregulars in proportion to the resources 
allocated. Man for man, partisan rangers likely tied down more enemy troops, destroyed 
more material, and garnered more press than any other enlisted men in either army. 
Although they could not themselves defeat a Union campaign, due to their small 
numbers, McNeill and Mosby none the less effectively resisted the occupation of 
thousands of Union troops with only a few hundred men. 
The greatest failing of partisan warfare was the Confederacy’s inability to 
duplicate these results. Mosby and McNeill’s success was the fortunate result of 
legislation directed elsewhere.  Rather than recruit promising officers and men from the 
ranks for duty behind enemy lines as partisans, the Partisan Ranger Act unsuccessfully 
attempted to control the guerrilla war in the West by incorporating the emerging fighters 
into the Confederacy. As a result, many “partisan rangers” never stopped being guerrillas, 
and most of the latter never took part in the charade at all. Because the Confederacy 
never developed a process of cultivating potential officers and men for partisan duty, the 
successes of men like Mosby and McNeill were, like cavalry raiders, entirely due to 
individual initiative. While officers like Forrest and Mosby possessed uncommon and 





success, Richmond did not attempt to locate or replicate this leadership in other irregular 
commands.  
Neither partisan rangers nor cavalry raiders, though composed of men properly 
enlisted in the Confederate service who served under proven combat leaders, were taken 
seriously by the southern government. Both were instead regulated to a distinctly local 
and secondary status, because southern leaders feared losing control of resources and 
doubted that irregular warfare could achieve decisive results. Napoleonic warfare 
emphasized concentration of forces to destroy the enemy’s army. Irregular warfare in 
contrast required its practitioners to disperse into small, independent units to contest 
occupation. The latter thus represented the antithesis of West Point training and 
conventional military thinking. As the Confederate army suffered more and more 
casualties, its leaders were increasingly unwilling to risk their soldiers and their cause by 
embracing an unfamiliar strategy. Irregular warfare was therefore not considered an 
essential part of the Confederacy’s response to the northern invasion. 
Guerrillas, while initially highly disruptive, had confirmed Richmond’s fears of 
irregular warfare by their indiscriminant violence and lack of discipline. Both resulted 
from the lack of an organized, unifying leadership or resilient ideology (embodied by the 
men who left their homes to fight in distant lands with the conventional field armies). 
These weaknesses doomed the guerrilla war to degenerate into anarchy and rapine, and 
undermined support for themselves and the Confederacy among the populace. The 
motivations of these guerrillas, at first stemming from their local orientation, and later 
increasingly dominated by predatory opportunism, rendered an organized pan-southern 





secession and controlling the slave population merely accentuated these underlying 
structural weaknesses. Guerrillas therefore had little in common with the twentieth 
century revolutionary movements some historians compare them to. Their defeat was not 
the result of Union responses but rather internal failings. Of the three types of irregular 
warfare in the Civil War, only guerrillas had proven themselves a failure.  
It is important to note that partisan rangers, and especially cavalry raiders, were 
not designed, even in their ideal form, to fully replace conventional forces. Raiders 
especially depended on conventional armies to safeguard a “home territory” for them to 
return to, and serve as a safe base of operations. Partisan rangers, though existing behind 
enemy lines, performed their diversion and logistical feats, like the raiders, for the benefit 
of conventional forces.  
Despite this caveat, it is clear from the performance of these soldiers that a greatly 
enlarged and systematic use of cavalry raiders and partisan rangers could have had 
decisive effects. By their hindrance of Union advances, bolstering of southern morale and 
exaction of political damage through their victories and resilience, these irregulars would 
have severely retarded Federal chances of success. When the Confederacy instead made 
the strategic decision to pursue a largely conventional war, they allowed the Union to use 
its inherent advantages in population size and materials to best affect.       
When examining the possibilities of irregular warfare in the American Civil War, 
historians must consider that there were more actors, and options, than the civilian 
guerrillas seen in the Trans-Mississippi Department. Distinct from these fighters, though 





(and thus sustainable), militarily and cost effective option that might have so greatly 
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